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ARTICLES
ASSET FORFEITURE, BURDENS OF
PROOF AND THE WAR ON DRUGS
MARC B. STAHL*
I. INTRODUCTION
The public perceives drug abuse to be one of society's most
pressing problems, ' and our legal system has catered to these senti-
ments. 2 In particular, civil forfeiture schemes have been increas-
ingly employed in the "war on drugs." In 1985, the Department of
* Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Cook County Public Defender. J.D., Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School, 1991. A.B., Georgetown University, 1988. The author
wishes to thank Professor Albert W. Alschuler of the University of Chicago Law School
for reviewing earlier drafts of this article.
1 In September 1989, a Gallup Poll reported that more than 60% of Americans
cited illegal drugs as the most important problem facing the nation. Randolph Ryan, A
Poverty Paint Job, BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 1990, at 11. As the economy soured, that
number dropped to 30% in April 1990, and 18%o in July 1990 (at which time 21% men-
tioned the federal budget deficit as the number one problem). Id.; Michael R. Kagay,
Deficit Raises as Much Alarm as Illegal Drugs, a Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1990, at A9.
Despite this shift in priorities, American attitudes toward illegal drugs, as well as alco-
holic beverages and tobacco cigarettes, indicate an intense and widespread public intol-
erance. In December 1990, the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse reported
that among 18- to 25-year-olds, the percentage who had used cocaine in the last month
went from 9% in the peak year of 1979 to 2%. Gina Kolata, Temperance: An Old Cycle
Repeats Itself, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1991, § 1 at 35. The percentage who had used any
illegal drug in the last month went from 37% in 1982 to 15%. Id. A December 1990
USA Today survey of 16- to 24-year-olds found that 77% favored random drug testing,
78% thought that marijuana should remain illegal and 58% identified drugs as the most
important problem they faced. Karen S. Peterson, Young Adults Are Leaning to the Right,
USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 1990, at ID.
2 In March 1988, the Reagan Administration announced a shift in drug policy, di-
recting efforts at the demand as well as supply side of the drug trade and adopting a
"zero tolerance" strategy. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus, Customs: No Leniency for Drugs at Borders,
WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1988, at A3; John Kendall, U.S. to Charge Smugglers of Even Small
Drug Amounts, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1988, at A33; Barbara Bradley, Users Now Prime Targets
in U.S. Antidrug Offensive, CHRIST. ScI. MONITOR, May 4, 1988, at 1. The more extreme
proposals in early 1988 included mandatory drug testing of all persons arrested and
almost all persons employed. See Meese Is Seeking to Require Drug Testing in All Arrests, N.Y.
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Justice created the National Assets Seizure and Forfeiture Fund and
collected $27 million from drug-related forfeitures. The yearly ac-
quisitions have grown to almost $500 million in 1990.3 At least $1.4
billion more in real and personal property has been seized and cur-
rently awaits forfeiture. 4 These efforts will doubtless continue in
earnest since they are supported by the highest levels of authority.
President Bush has boasted that "[a]sset forfeiture laws allow us to
take the ill-gotten gains of drug kingpins and use them to put more
cops on the streets and more prosecutors in court." 5
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1988, at A16; Bill McAllister, Meese Asks Drug Tests for 'Most' Workers;
Mayors Assail Federal Efforts as Poorly Run, Underfunded, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1988, at Al.
The new approach included stepped-up efforts at asset forfeiture. See, e.g., 75 Cars
Seized by Customs in Border Drug Crackdown, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1988, § 1 at 4; 542 Drug
Vehicles in 5 Weeks Seized by Customs Service, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1988, at A32; Matt Lait,
Research Ship Seized in 'Zero Tolerance' Drug Raid, WASH. POST, May 20, 1988, at A12; Ruth
Marcus, Vehicle Seizures Stepped Up in Drug War; Truck, Several Mercedes Confiscated Under 'Zero
Tolerance' Policy, WASH. POST, May 10, 1988, at A9; Laura Parker, Yacht Seized Over .1
Ounce of Marijuana; Vessel to Be Sold Under Tough Policy, WASH. POST, May 9, 1988, at Al.
The "zero tolerance" strategy is only the most prominent manifestation of the gov-
ernment's increasing concern over the dangers of illegal drugs. Judge Greenberg of the
Third Circuit has described recent legislative efforts:
[C]ongress has been stiffening the penalties for drug related offenses in an effort to
combat a national drug problem of epidemic proportion. In legislation ranging
from the Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984, to the Narcot-
ics Penalties and Enforcement Act of 1986, and to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Congress has sent out a clear message that narcotics offenses are to be dealt with
harshly. Congress's provision for civil forfeiture of real property in the Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984 is a critical part of its legislative drive to wipe
out drug trafficking. [We are] in the midst of a national blizzard ofanti-drug legisla-
tion and activity ....
United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d 659, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1989) (Greenberg, J.,
dissenting).
3 Sean P. Murphy, 10 Sites Are Seized in U.S. Drug Sweep, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 1991,
at 17.
4 Use Drug Profits to Treat Addicts, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18, 1991, at 37. The federal govern-
ment collected $94 million from these efforts in 1986, $178 million in 1987, $207 mil-
lion in 1988 and $358 million in 1989. See Federal Seizure of Illegal Assets Nets Government
$1.5 Billion Since 1985, U.S.L.W. - Daily Ed. (Feb. 4, 1991); Lisa Belkin, The Booty of
Drugs Enriches Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1990, § 1 at 18; see also Murphy, supra note 3;
Christine Kukka, Selling Drug Dealers'Seized Properties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, § 10 at 5;
Michael Isikoff, Drug Raids Net Much Valuable Property - and Legal Uproar, WASH. POST,
Apr. 1, 1991, at Al; Sam V. Meddis, Supplies of Cocaine Up; Price Down, USA TODAY, Jan.
28, 1991, at IA. These sources give slightly varying figures. In addition, similar figures
are attributed to civil forfeitures for drug-related activities, all forfeitures for drug-re-
lated activities and all forfeitures.
TheJustice Department has predicted that it will generate $700 million in forfeiture
proceeds during 1991. Isikoff, supra this note. Due to the decline in the real estate
market, receipts from asset forfeitures have slowed and the final figure for 1991 might
be closer to $500 million. Kukka, supra this note; see also Seizure Laws Victimize the Innocent,
Report Says, UPI, Aug. 12, 1991 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File).
5 President George Bush, Remarks By President Bush to Attorney General's Summit on Law
Enforcement. Responses to Violent Crime, Fed. News Serv., Mar. 5, 1991 (available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, FEDNEW File). Former Attorney General Richard Thornburgh once
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Most civil forfeitures directed at drug activity occur under the
aegis of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970 (hereinafter "the Act"). 6 Section 881 of the Act origi-
nally declared the following to be forfeitable: all controlled sub-
stances, 7 all raw materials and equipment used to manufacture
controlled substances8 and all vehicles used to distribute controlled
substances .9
quipped, "Our new message to drug profiteers is, 'You make it, we'll take it.'" Federal
Seizure of Illegal Assets, supra note 4.
6 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1992). Civil forfeitures for drug-related criminal conduct are
also allowed under 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-782 (1992) (hereinafter "§ 781") and a number of
state statutes. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 1671-1683 (1991) (probable
cause standard). Almost all of these civil forfeiture provisions provide for forfeitures
with limited procedural protections and are susceptible to the constitutional challenges
described in this article. But see N.Y. Civ. PtAc. L. & R. § 10:421 (McKinney 1991) (state
bears burden of proof by preponderance of evidence after criminal conviction and by
clear and convincing evidence before criminal conviction). The language in § 781, for
example, is nearly identical to that in the Act's provisions for the forfeiture of vehicles -
§ 881 (a)(4). Section 781 expressly permits forfeiture via the customs laws, employing
the same procedures as § 881. 49 U.S.C. §§ 782-784 (1992). Section 881's provisions
for forfeiture of vehicles, however, have been interpreted more broadly than § 781.
United States v. One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F.2d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 1981).
Criminal forfeiture for drug-related criminal conduct is provided for in 21 U.S.C.
§§ 848, 853 (1992). Section 853 is more general in its coverage than either of the fed-
eral civil forfeiture provisions, applying to "[any property constituting or derived from,
any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation
[and] any.., property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit,
or to facilitate the commission of, such violation." 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(l)-(2). In order
to permit forfeiture under § 853, however, a criminal conviction for violation of drug
laws is a necessary predicate. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d
869, 876 (3d Cir. 1987). Even after a guilty verdict in a criminal case, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the particular property was involved in ille-
gal activities to affect a forfeiture under § 853. United States v. Elgersma, 929 F.2d
1538, 1544-48 (1 lth Cir. 1991). But see Sandini, 816 F.2d at 876.
The civil forfeiture provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act are the federal government's primary means of permanently seizing drug-
related property.
7 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1), (8). Section 881 initially declared forfeitable "[aIll con-
trolled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in
violation of this title." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1). In 1984, § 881 was amended to include
"[aIll controlled substances which have been possessed in violation of this title." 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(8).
8 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(2) reads: "All raw materials, products, and equipment of any
kind which are used, or intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing,
delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this title."
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(9) reads: "All listed chemicals, all drug manufacturing equip-
ment, all tableting machines, all encapsulating machines, and all gelatin capsules, which
have been imported, exported, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or intended to be
distributed, imported, or exported, in violation of a felony provision of this title or title
III."
9 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) reads in part: "All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles,
or vessels, which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to
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The reach of § 881 has been widened. In 1978, Congress ad-
ded § 881(a)(6), which permits the forfeiture of all profits from the
drug trade and all assets purchased with such proceeds.' 0 The 1978
amendments also cover assets intended to be given in exchange for
controlled substances, I" allowing the forfeiture of property never
actually involved with illegal activities.
In 1984, Congress added § 881(a)(7), which authorizes the for-
feiture of all real property used in any manner to facilitate a viola-
tion of drug laws. 12 The statute applies to entire tracts of land and
all improvements, regardless of what portion of the property facili-
tated the illegal activities.13 Improvements added to the real estate
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property de-
scribed in paragraph (1), (2), or (9) .... "
A related provision applies to property used as a container for illegal drugs or items
used to produce or distribute illegal drugs. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(3) reads: "All property
which is used, or intended for use, as a container for property described in paragraph
(1), (2), or (9)."
10 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) reads in part: "All moneys, negotiable instruments, securi-
ties, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in
exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this title, all proceeds traceable to
such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or in-
tended to be used to facilitate any violation of this title ... "
Il Id.
12 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) reads in part: "All real property, including any right, tide,
and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and
any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any man-
ner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this title .... "
13 The language of the statute is explicit, permitting forfeiture of "[a]ll real property
... in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements ......
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (emphasis added). Courts have given the statute a broad reading.
See United States v. .697 Acres of Land, No. 90-6060, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 3900, at *4
(4th Cir. Mar. 11, 1991) ("Should the claimant fail to discharge his burden then the
entire tract of land is subject to forfeiture despite the fact that only a portion was used
unlawfully."); United States v. 2 Burditt St., 924 F.2d 383, 385 (1st Cir. 1991) ("The law
is well settled that, in a forfeiture proceeding under § 881 (a) (7), property in its entirety
is forfeitable even if only a portion of it was used for illegal purposes."); United States v.
3097 S.W. I11th Ave., 921 F.2d 1551, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. 141st
St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880 (2d Cir. 1990) ("IT]he plain language of the statute indi-
cates Congress' intent that an entire parcel of land may be subject to forfeiture even if
only part of it is directly connected to drug activity."); United States v. One 107.9 Acre
Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1990) ("When it is invoked by the govern-
ment it embraces all of a unitary tract although only part is used in violation of the
provision of § 881(a)(7)."); United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41,45 (1st Cir.
1989) ("Both the statute and the case law authorize forfeiture proceedings against the
entire tract of land, regardless of the magnitude of the infraction."); United States v.
Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e reject appellants' argument that
only the smaller portion of the property, where the cocaine sales actually occurred, can
be forfeited .... This property, although divided by a road, is legally described as a
single, undivided tract .... We adopt the reasoning of the court below that the 'whole of
any lot or tract of land' must be determined from the duly recorded instruments and
documents filed in the county offices where the defendant property is located. Conse-
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after the commission of the predicate act but before the forfeiture
suit are also covered. 4
Section 881 affords defendants substantially less procedural
protections than traditional criminal prosecutions. Particularly
striking is the contrast in burdens of proof. In order to impose
criminal sanctions, the government must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt.15 A civil forfeiture action brought under the Act,
however, places the burden of proof on the defendant. Once a
court finds probable cause to believe that property was involved in a
drug crime, the claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the property was not involved in any illegal activities.'
6
Currency, buildings, land, automobiles, airplanes, ships and other
significant pieces of property have been taken by the government. 1
7
Homes and even public housing leaseholds have been forfeited.' 8
quently, the 26-acre parcel, in its entirety, is subject to this forfeiture.") (citations omit-
ted); United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232, 233, 235 (9th Cir. 1988) ($90,000
home forfeited when marijuana plants found growing on less than 200 square feet of
property); United States v. 16 Clinton St., 730 F. Supp. 1265, 1269-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
("Because the statute distinguishes neither between leaseholds within the fee interest
and the entire interest, nor between part of the property and the whole, plaintiff's argu-
ment that the activity took place within separate leaseholds is inconsistent with any rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute.").
14 In 2 Burditt St., 924 F.2d at 383, $42,000 in improvements were made to the prop-
erty after the illegal conduct occurred and before the forfeiture proceedings began.
Although the improvements increased the value of the property beyond its worth at the
time of the illegal conduct, reimbursement for the value of the improvements was de-
nied. Id. at 384-85.
15 See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 900 F.2d 470 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d at 396; United States v. 4492
S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. $5,644,540 in United
States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. 1982 Yukon Delta
Houseboat, 774 F.2d 1432 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Air-
craft, 691 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602 (7th Cir.
1982).
18 The Federal District Court for Rhode Island has described the harsh results of
forfeiting public housing leaseholds:
The forfeiture of the apartment and the federal housing assistance payments which
subsidize it would take from defendant her home and the only means by which she
can obtain housing for herself and her children at this time. Such a forfeiture is
fundamentally different in nature from the forfeiture of land or a house, whether
owned outright or leased. An order of forfeiture here would be, in effect, a sen-
tence of homelessness for the defendant and her three young children.
United States v. Robinson, 721 F. Supp. 1541, 1544 (D.R.I. 1989) (criminal forfeiture
proceeding found to violate the Eighth Amendment). See also United States v. Leasehold
Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v.
Leasehold Interest in 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1990); United States v.
Leasehold Interest in 900 E. 40th St., Apartment 102, 740 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1990);
Richmond Tenants Org. v. Kemp, 753 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Va. 1990), aft'd, 956 F.2d
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Section 881 produces devastating consequences based upon mini-
mal proof.
In today's "drug war" climate, the broader implications of civil
forfeiture laws have escaped close scrutiny. This article will argue
that § 88 l's placement of the burden of proof violates the Due Pro-
cess Clause. First, the Act's statutory requirements for affecting a
forfeiture will be analyzed. 19 The article will then discuss burdens
of proof in judicial proceedings. 20 In particular, the differences be-
tween civil and criminal sanctions will be explored.21 Finally, the
article will conclude that forfeitures of vehicles, real property and
monetary instruments allegedly used to promote illegal activities
constitute criminal punishment. 22 Thus, § 881 should not be ap-
plied to affect such forfeitures unless the government proves its case
beyond a reasonable doubt.
II. PROCEDURAL STEPS FOR AFFECTING A FORFEITURE
A. SEIZURE OF PROPERTY
Section 881 offers law enforcement officials a variety of proce-
dures for seizing property. First, property may be seized according
to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime
Claims (hereinafter "Supplemental Admiralty Rules"). Section 881
states, "Any property subject to civil forfeiture to the United States
under this title may be seized by the Attorney General upon process
issued pursuant to the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty
and Maritime Claims by any district court of the United States hav-
1300 (4th Cir. 1992); D. Bryson & R. Youmans, Crime, Drugs, and Subsidized Housing,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 440, 443 (1990).
OnJune 25, 1990, federal magistrates in 23 cities throughout the U.S. issued orders
finding probable cause that various public housing residences had been used or had
been intended to be used to commit felony violations of federal drug laws. Kemp Plan:
Evict Drug Dealers from Public Housing, CHI. TRIB., May 16, 1990, § 1 at 14 [hereinafter
Kemp Plan]. The next day, the tenants were notified that they had 30 days to respond if
they chose to deny the accusations (20 days to claim a property interest and then 10 days
to prepare their cases). See 121 NostrandAve., 760 F. Supp. at 1026; Information Release,
U.S. Department ofJustice, United States Attorney Northern District of Illinois,June 26,
1990; see also Kemp Plan, supra this note; Andrew Fegelman, U.S. Law Helps CHA Fight
Drugs, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 1990, § 2 at 13. The forfeitures were part of the National
Housing Asset Forfeiture Project, a program developed by Secretary of Housing and
Urban DevelopmentJack Kemp. Under the program, the government evicted residents
through forfeiture rather than traditional forcible entry and detainer actions, which re-
quire proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
19 See infra notes 23-70 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 79-128 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 129-260 and accompanying text.
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ing jurisdiction over the property." 23 Subsequent amendments to
the Supplemental Admiralty Rules provide for seizures without
prior judicial approval. 24
Section 881 outlines alternative means for the government to
seize property. A seizure may be made incident to an arrest or in-
spection. 25 Likewise, law enforcement officials may seize property
when the Attorney General has probable cause to believe that the
property is subject to forfeiture or is dangerous to health or safety. 2 6
The Act explains that "[t]he Government may request the issuance
of a warrant authorizing the seizure of property subject to forfeiture
under this section in the same manner as provided for a search war-
rant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. ' 27 Some
courts have required the government to obtain a warrant prior to
seizure, unless exigent circumstances are present.28 On its face,
however, the language does not require a warrant, and many courts
have allowed warrantless seizures. 29
23 21 U.S.C. § 881(b). See also FED. R. CIV. P. SUPPLEMENTAL ADMIRALTY RULES C(3)
(1988) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTAL ADMIRALTY RULES]; United States v. Turner, 933 F.2d
240, 244 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1262-63
(2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Leasehold Interest in 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. 505,
507 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
24 SUPPLEMENTAL ADMIRALTY RULES C(3) begins:
Except in action by the United Statesforfofeituresforfederal statutory violations, the verified
complaint and any supporting papers shall be reviewed by the court and, if the
conditions for an action in rem appear to exist, an order so stating and authorizing a
warrant for the arrest of the vessel or other property that is the subject of the action
shall issue and be delivered to the clerk who shall prepare the warrant and deliver it
to the marshal for service.
Id. (emphasis added). The advisory committee notes accompanying the 1985 amend-
ments explain that "[r]equirements for prior court review ... do not apply to actions by
the United States for forfeitures .... SUPPLEMENTAL ADMIRALTY RULES C(3) advisory
committee note.
As § 881 provides for the U.S. government to seize property upon a violation of
federal law, seizure is authorized without prior judicial approval. Courts have pointed
out this language in § 881 actions. E.g., In re Warrant to Seize One 1988 Chevrolet
Monte Carlo v. United States, 861 F.2d 307, 310 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. South
Side Fin., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 791, 799 (N.D. Ill. 1991); United States v. 3400-3410 W.
16th St., 636 F. Supp. 142, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
25 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(1).
26 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(3)-(4).
27 21 U.S.C. § 881(b).
28 E.g., United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1262-63 (2d Cir. 1989);
One 1988 Chevrolet lonte Carlo, 861 F.2d at 311; United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457,
1469-70 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 330 (1st Cir. 1979);
United States v. Leasehold Interest in 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. 505, 507 (E.D. Mich.
1990).
29 See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 933 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Hill, No. 88-1176, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 5439, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 28, 1991); United
States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, 711 F.2d 1297, 1302 (5th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 401-02 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357,
280 [Vol. 83
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Section 881 also allows seizures pursuant to the customs laws.30
Law enforcement officials must establish probable cause for seizure
and secure a warrant from a federal magistrate or a state court in the
same district as the property. Upon receiving such a warrant, the
Attorney General or customs officials may seize the property.3'
Finally, forfeiture proceedings may be instituted without a prior
seizure of property. If the government prevails in the forfeiture ac-
tion, § 881 allows subsequent seizure of the property.3 2
The government need not provide prior warning to the owner
in most § 881 seizures. The Seventh Circuit has succinctly stated
that "pre-seizure hearings are not constitutionally required, so long
as interested persons are given notice and an opportunity for a post-
seizure hearing." 33
A home or residential leasehold, however, cannot be seized
without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard.3 4 The pre-
seizure notice requirement provides only limited protection. Rea-
soning that an individual's interest in a home is unique, courts have
explicitly held that notice is not necessary before a § 881 forfeiture
of non-residential real estate.35 Additionally, courts will approve a
forfeiture even after a residence has been seized without pre-seizure
notice.36
367-68 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154,
157-58 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Milham, 590 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. 3400-3410 W. 16th St., 636 F. Supp. 142, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1986). See also
infra note 91 and accompanying text.
30 21 U.S.C. § 881(d).
31 19 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1992); 21 U.S.C. § 881(d); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. If customs
officials execute the warrant, the U.S. attorney for the district in which the property is
located must be promptly notified of the seizure. 19 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
32 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(2). See also United States v. 73.26 Acres of Land Located at
Town Rd. # 4, 757 F. Supp. 17, 18-19 (D. Vt. 1991) (court has jurisdiction over real
property prior to seizure).
33 Willis v. United States, 787 F.2d 1089, 1094 (7th Cir. 1986). See also Calero-To-
ledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-80 (1974); United States v. South
Side Fin., Inc., 755 F. Supp. 791, 800-01 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
34 United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 101 (3d Cir. 1991); United
States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1265 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[A] showing of
exigent circumstances seems unlikely when a person's home is at stake, since, unlike
some forms of property, a home cannot be readily moved or dissipated .... Thus,
preseizure notice and hearing would not frustrate the statutory purpose of
§ 881(a)(7)."); United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp.
1015, 1028-29 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Richmond Tenants Org. v. Kemp, 753 F. Supp. 607
(E.D. Va. 1990), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1300 (4th Cir. 1992).
35 United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 874-75 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. 16 Clinton St., 730 F. Supp. 1265, 1271-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
36 92 Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d at 101; 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1265.
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B. INITIATION OF FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
Under § 881, ownership of the property vests in the govern-
ment the moment the property is involved in a crime.3 7 Despite its
ownership of the property, the government must commence a for-
feiture action within a reasonable length of time after seizure. If the
property is seized pursuant to the customs laws or upon a finding of
probable cause by the Attorney General, the U.S. Code requires for-
feiture proceedings to begin in a timely fashion.38
The provisions for seizure incident to arrest or inspection and
pursuant to the Supplemental Admiralty Rules do not establish any
time in which forfeiture proceedings must begin. 39 Three sources
of authority, however, suggest that the government must proceed
with a forfeiture action shortly after seizure under these procedures
as well.
First, the customs laws govern the seizure and forfeiture of all
property under § 881 to the extent that the customs provisions are
consistent with the Act.40 The customs laws demand prompt action
by the government regardless of the seizure mechanism. 4 1 Addi-
tionally, Congress mandated expedited procedures for the seizure
of conveyances in 1988.42 These provisions guarantee quick action
when a vehicle is seized, but do not provide any protection when
other assets are involved. Under § 888 of Title 21 of the U.S. Code,
the government must notify a vehicle owner of a seizure "[alt the
37 21 U.S.C. § 881 (h) explains: "All right, title, and interest in property described in
subsection (a) shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to
forfeiture under this section." Traditionally, most forfeiture statutes have been inter-
preted as providing for immediate forfeiture upon the commission of the predicate act.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 627 (1989) ("[The forfei-
ture statute] reflects the application of the long-recognized and lawful practice of vesting
title to any forfeitable assets, in the United States, at the time of the criminal act giving
rise to forfeiture."); United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1890). The doctrine has
been applied in § 881 litigation. United States v. 2 Burditt St., 924 F.2d 383, 385 (1st
Cir. 1991); United States v. $5,644,540 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1364
(9th Cir. 1986).
38 19 U.S.C. § 1604 (1992) ("It shall be the duty of the Attorney General of the
United States immediately to inquire into the facts of cases reported to him .... [P]roper
proceedings [are] to be commenced and prosecuted, without delay .... ") (emphasis
added); 21 U.S.C. § 88 1(b) ("In the event of seizure pursuant to paragraph (3) or (4) of
this subsection, proceedings under subsection (d) of this section shall be instituted
promptly.") (emphasis added).
39 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(1); SUPPLEMENTAL ADMIRALTY RULES C. The Supplemental Ad-
miralty Rules do place strict limits on the time for an answer and for discovery, sug-
gesting that the forfeiture proceedings should begin soon after the seizure. Id. C(4), (6).
40 21 U.S.C. § 881(d).
41 See supra note 38.
42 21 U.S.C. § 888 (1992).
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earliest practicable opportunity after determining ownership. '43
Within sixty days of receiving a claim and cost bond, the govern-
ment must commence a forfeiture action, show good cause for an
extension or secure the consent of the claimant to delay the
proceedings. 44
The Constitution also provides protection for property owners
seeking speedy dispositions. The Due Process Clause of the Consti-
tution prohibits unreasonable delays in the commencement of for-
feiture proceedings. 45 The Ninth Circuit, dismissing a forfeiture
claim after a twenty-one-month delay, stated that "[i]t is settled law
that if a civil forfeiture is to succeed, it must be instituted with rea-
sonable promptness after seizure of property. Delay in the institu-
tion of forfeiture proceedings must be justified. In the absence of
such justification, an extended delay violates due process. '" 46
Although no hard and fast rules exist, the constitutional prohibition
provides some protection against excessive delay.
Finally, formal forfeiture proceedings are not always necessary
after a seizure. A summary procedure may be employed to forfeit
controlled substances, vehicles used to transport or store controlled
substances, monetary instruments or any other property worth less
than $500,000. To affect a summary forfeiture, the government
must send written notice to each party that appears to have any in-
terest in the property.47 Upon notice, an interested party must file a
claim asserting such interest within twenty days and must post
"[blond to the U.S. in the penal sum of $5,000 or 10% of the value
of the claimed property." 48 If a party fails to file a claim and pay the
bond, a customs officer may summarily declare the property
forfeited.49
If a party files a claim and posts the bond, the government must
43 Id. § 888(b).
44 Id. § 888(c). The 60-day limit has been applied strictly. See, e.g., Dwyer v. United
States, 716 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (62-day delay in mailing of seizure
notice results in return of vehicle and prohibition of further forfeiture proceedings).
45 United States v. $8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556 (1983);
United States v. Turner, 933 F.2d 240, 246 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Thirteen
Machine Guns, 689 F.2d 861, 863 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1973 Buick
Riviera, 560 F.2d 897, 901 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. One Motor Yacht Named
Mercury, 527 F.2d 1112, 1114 (Ist Cir. 1975); Skarkisian v. United States, 472 F.2d 468,
472 (10th Cir. 1973).
46 Thirteen Machine Guns, 689 F.2d at 863.
47 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1992).
48 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1992).
49 19 U.S.C. §8 1608, 1609 (1992). See also United States v. One 1986 Chevrolet
Van, 927 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1991); Chavis v. United States, No. 91-7509, 1991 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11043, at *2-3 (4th Cir. May 31, 1991); Floyd v. United States, 860 F.2d
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pursue a forfeiture action in the federal district court for the district
in which the property was seized. 50
C. BURDENS OF PROOF UNDER § 881
A civil forfeiture action offers the government substantial ad-
vantages over a traditional criminal prosecution. The government
need only demonstrate probable cause to believe that the property
facilitated illegal activities. Once probable cause has been estab-
lished, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the property was not used in such a
manner.51 Every federal circuit has interpreted § 881 as shifting the
burden of proof to the claimant once the government establishes
probable cause. 52 The Federal Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
999, 1003-04 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Wood, 851 F.2d 185, 188 (8th Cir.
1988).
The First Circuit has described summary forfeiture under § 881 as an administrative
rather than a judicial approach:
[One of] the discernible policy objectives of the forfeiture laws [is] keeping civil
forfeiture actions of a certain size (under [$500,000]) on the administrative rather
than the judicial side. So read, the law conserves hard-pressed judicial resources
and facilitates resort to simpler, quicker, less expensive administrative procedures
which Congress thought it advisable to formulate.
In re Warrant to Seize One 1988 Chevrolet Monte Carlo v. United States, 861 F.2d 307,
310 (1st Cir. 1988). See also Willis v. United States, 787 F.2d 1089, 1091 (7th Cir. 1986).
The government may also summarily seize property that is perishable or subject to
waste. The proceeds of any sale of perishable property are to be deposited with the U.S.
district court until a final determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1612 (1992).
50 19 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1610 (1992).
51 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) provides that the customs laws govern the procedure for for-
feitures under § 881. 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1992) establishes the burden of proof in such
forfeiture actions: "In all suits or actions . . .brought for the forfeiture of any vessel,
vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or baggage seized under the provisions of any law relat-
ing to the collection of duties on imports or tonnage, where the property is claimed by
any person, the burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant; and in all suits or actions
brought for the recovery of the value of any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, merchandise, or
baggage, because of violation of any such law, the burden of proof shall be upon the
defendant: Provided, that probable cause shall be first shown for the institution of such
suit or action, to be judged by the court ...."
52 United States v. Brock, 747 F.2d 761, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. 1933
Commonwealth Ave., 913 F.2d 1, 3 (Ist Cir. 1990); United States v. Aiello, 912 F.2d 4, 7
(2d Cir. 1990); United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1267 (2d Cir. 1989)
("In a forfeiture proceeding brought under § 881, the burden is initially upon the gov-
ernment to establish its right to forfeiture by demonstrating probable cause .... To
establish its case, the government must have reasonable grounds, rising above the level
of mere suspicion, to believe that certain property is subject to forfeiture."); United
States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1982); United States
v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. .697 Acres of
Land, No. 90-6060, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 3900, at *3-4 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 1991);
United States v. 7715 Betsy Bruce Lane, 906 F.2d 110, 111 (4th Cir. 1990) ("In a civil
forfeiture proceeding the government must show probable cause that the property is
subject to forfeiture. Once the government has made this showing, the burden shifts to
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cuit has described the relative burdens:
[T]he government need only show probable cause to believe that the
property was used for a specified illegal purpose. Probable cause to
forfeit requires only a "reasonable ground for belief of guilt[,] sup-
ported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion"
that the property is subject to forfeiture. Once the government makes
this showing, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the property was not used in violation of
the statute.53
The government need only establish a reasonable belief that the
property was connected to an illegal drug transaction in some man-
ner. The government may rely on hearsay, circumstantial evidence
the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 'that the factual predicates for
forfeiture have not been met.' "); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th
Cir. 1989); United States v. Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d 994, 997-98
(5th Cir. 1990); United States v. $364,960 in United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323
(5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Route 1, Box 24, No. 90-3070, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
597, at *3 (6th Cir.Jan. 15, 1991); United States v. 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d 213, 216
(6th Cir. 1988); United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 199 (6th Cir.
1978); United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 609 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v. One
1976 Mercedes Benz 280S; 618 F.2d 453.456 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. 3639-2nd
St., 869 F.2d 1093, 1095 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t was incumbent upon the government to
establish the presence of probable cause. Probable cause in a forfeiture proceeding is 'a
reasonable ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof but more
than mere suspicion.' ... Once this initial showing has been made, the burden shifts to
the party opposing forfeiture to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
the property is not subject to forfeiture or that a defense to forfeiture is applicable.");
United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F.2d 525, 526 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 904 F.2d 487, 490-91 (9th Cir. 1990);
United States v. $5,644,540 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir.
1986); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1976); Bram-
blev. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 970 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. 3097 S.W. 111th
Ave., 921 F.2d 1551, 1556-57 (1 1th Cir. 1991); United States v. $3,686,000 in United
States Currency, 762 F.2d 895, 903 (11 th Cir. 1985); United States v. One 1979 Porsche
Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424, 1426-27 (11th Cir. 1983).
In the context of currency, the claimant's burden can be quite high. The govern-
ment need not tie the proceeds to any particular drug transaction. United States v. 92
Buena Vista Ave., 937 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Parcels of Land, 903
F.2d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. $41,305 in Currency and Traveler's Checks,
802 F.2d 1339, 1343 (1 1th Cir. 1986); United States v. 1982 Yukon Delta Houseboat,
774 F.2d 1432, 1435 n.4 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Eighty-Eight Designated Ac-
counts, 740 F. Supp. 842, 845 (S.D. Fla. 1990); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.,
738 F. Supp. 854, 857 (D.NJ. 1990), rev'don other grounds, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991). In
responding to the government's allegations, the claimant must establish a legitimate
source and then must also prove that particular funds are directly traceable to that
source. See United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v.
One 1980 Rolls Royce, 905 F.2d 89, 90-92 (5th Cir. 1990); Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d at
42; $41,305 in Currency & Traveler's Checks, 802 F.2d at 1345; United States v. Banco
Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1158-63 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. $83,320 in
United States Currency, 682 F.2d 573, 577-78 (6th Cir. 1982).




or facts learned after the seizure.54 The standard effectively leaves
claimants with the burden of proving their innocence or losing their
homes and other property.
D. THE INNOCENT OWNER DEFENSE UNDER § 881
The statute provides that no vehicles, proceeds or real estate
will be forfeited if the violation occurred without the knowledge or
consent of the owner. 55 The "innocent owner" defense, however,
provides minimal protection. First, the burden is on the owner to
prove innocence. 56 The Federal District Court for the Northern
54 United States v. One 1986 Chevrolet Van, 927 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 1991); 28
Emery St., 914 F.2d at 5; Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d at 38; United States v. Four Parcels of
Real Property, 893 F.2d 1245, 1250 (11th Cir. 1990); 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d at 217
n.3; United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 899 (1st. Cir.
1987); $41,305 in Currency and Traveler's Checks, 802 F.2d at 1343; $5,644,540 in United
States Currency, 799 F.2d at 1362; 1982 Yukon Delta Houseboat, 774 F.2d at 1434; One 1976
Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F.2d at 526; Brock, 747 F.2d at 763; United States v. One 56 Foot
Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. One 1974
Porsche 91 l-S, 682 F.2d 283, 286 (1st Cir. 1982); Eighty-Eight Designated Accounts, 740 F.
Supp. at 845; 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. at 857, rev'd on other grounds, 937 F.2d 98;
United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
Claimants, on the other hand, are not allowed to rely on hearsay. The higher pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard faced by claimants demands more formal rules of
evidence. United States v. One 1968 Piper Navaho Twin Engine Aircraft, 594 F.2d 1040,
1042 (5th Cir. 1979); In re 1957 S. Macon Way, 704 F. Supp. 1025, 1026 (D. Colo.
1989).
55 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) guarantees that "[n]o conveyance shall be forfeited
under this paragraph to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or
omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the
knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and (7)
each guarantee that "[n]o property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the ex-
tent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that
owner."
56 United States v. Parcel of Land off Williamsville Rd., No. 91-1067, 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5056, at *4 (1st Cir. 1991); .697 Acres of Land, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 3900 at *5
("Under the correct standard, [the claimant] would have to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that she did not know of, or consent to, the improper use of her prop-
erty."); United States v. One Lot of United States Currency, 927 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir.
1991); Route 1, Box 24, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 597 at *3; United States v. Sixty Acres in
Etowa County, 930 F.2d 857, 859 (11 th Cir. 1991); Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919
F.2d at 999; 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d at 3; 7715 Betsy Bruce Lane, 906 F.2d at 111; 4492 S.
Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1267 (2d Cir.); 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 626; United States v.
$4,255,000 in United States Currency, 762 F.2d 895, 906-07 (1 1th Cir. 1985) ("[T]he
claimant, and not the government, bear[s] the burden of proof on the 'innocent owner'
defense."); United States v. 3229 S.W. 23rd St., 768 F. Supp. 340, 347 (S.D. Fla. 1991);
Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. at 1299; 1957 S. Macon Way, 704 F. Supp. at 1026; United
States v. 3400-3410 W. 16th St., 636 F. Supp. 142, 146 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("The plain
meaning of this last clause of § 881(a)(7) clearly places the burden on the property
owner to come forward at the forfeiture trial to prove his 'ignorance' defense.").
The text of § 881 supports this interpretation. All three innocent owner provisions
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District of Illinois has explained, "[t]he claimants must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that whatever drug-related activity
took place on their property was without their knowledge or
consent." 57
Even if the claimant provides evidence indicating lack of knowl-
edge and consent,58 the government can prevail by showing that it
would be reasonable to believe that the owner was aware. The Fed-
eral District Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted:
[I]t is not the government's burden in these actions to prove existence
of actual knowledge, but the claimant's burden to prove the absence of
actual knowledge .... [1]n forfeiture actions, if a court finds it reason-
able to infer from the objective evidence that the claimant had or must
have had actual knowledge of the drug transaction, then the claimant
cannot meet his or her burden of proof in opposing summary judg-
ment simply by asserting ignorance. In other words, although courts
have maintained that an innocent ownership defense turns on a claim-
ant's actual, and not constructive, knowledge of the illicit activity
which gave rise to the forfeiture action, if the evidence supports a
"reasonable inference" of actual knowledge and the claimant fails to
come forward with anything more than a naked protestation that he or
she really didn't know of the illicit activity, the claimant's defense of
innocent ownership fails. 59
Thus, the burden is placed on the claimant and the standard makes
its proof difficult. The claimant must prove a negative - the ab-
dictate that the innocence be "[e]stablished by that owner." 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4)(C),
(6), (7).
57 United States v. 8848 S. Commercial St., 757 F. Supp. 871, 880 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
58 Some jurisdictions take the stance that either a lack of knowledge or a lack of
consent is enough to invoke the innocent owner defense. See United States v. 141st St.
Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Requiring a claimant to disprove both knowl-
edge and consent ignores Congress' desire to preserve the property of innocent owners
and, as indicated, renders the phrase 'or consent' superfluous .... "); United States v.
One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Sixty
Acres in Etowa County, 727 F. Supp. at 1418-19; United States v. 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710
F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Under normal canons of statutory construction, the
court must give the effect to Congress' use of the word 'or' by reading the terms 'knowl-
edge' and 'consent' disjunctively.").
Other jurisdictions have decided that the claimant must prove both lack of knowl-
edge and lack of consent. See .697 Acres of Land, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 3900 at *4-5
("The owner must show that she had no knowledge of, nor did she consent to, the
unlawful use of her property."); United States v. One Parcel of Land, Known As Lot
11 1-B, Tax Map Key 4-4-03-71(4), 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[Ilf the claim-
ant either knew or consented to the illegal activities, the 'innocent owner' defense is un-
available.") (emphasis in original); United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d
1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. 418 57th St., 737 F. Supp. 749, 750-51
(E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 922 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1991).
59 8848 S. Commercial St., 757 F. Supp. at 884 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (citations omitted).
1992] 287
MARC B. STAHL
sence of actual knowledge. 60
Finally, many jurisdictions have read an additional requirement
into § 88 I's innocent owner defense. In addition to proving lack of
knowledge and consent, the owner must also prove that he or she
took all reasonable steps to prevent the violation. 61 Thus, courts
60 See .697 Acres of Land, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 3900 at *5; Sixty Acres in Etowa County,
930 F.2d at 859; United States v. Aiello, 912 F.2d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. 15
Black Ledge Drive, 897 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 1990); $4,255,000 in United States Currency,
762 F.2d at 906; Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. at 1299. Under the circumstances,
claimants will face greater difficulty proving innocence than the government would face
proving guilt. One commentator reflected on the dilemma:
The element of disproving knowledge presents a good example of the difficulty of
proving a negative. The owner must stand in court and proclaim his lack of knowl-
edge, yet there is rarely any hard evidence of this. On the other hand, if the govern-
ment were to bear the burden of proof, as it does in a criminal case, it usually could
produce affirmative evidence that the claimant knew of the intended criminal use of
his property.
Peter Petrov, Note, Due Process Implications of Shifting the Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Proceed-
ings Arising Out of Illegal Drug Transactions, 1984 DUKE LJ. 822, 839 (emphasis in original).
61 Originally, this standard was enunciated as a constitutional minimum by the
Supreme Court: "[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim.., of an owner
who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but
also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed
use of his property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfei-
ture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive." Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974).
Many jurisdictions have incorporated the "all that reasonably could have been
done" requirement into the innocent owner defense of § 88 1, often grafting the require-
ment onto the "consent" prong. See, e.g., United States v. 15603 85th Ave., 933 F.2d
976, 982 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. 418 57th St., 922 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir.
1991); 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 879; United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58 Foot
Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 888-89 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. 1966 Beechcraft
Aircraft Model King Air A90, 777 F.2d 947, 951-52 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. One
1987 Mercedes Benz Roadster 560 SEC, No. 89-C3084, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2757, at
* 11-12 (N.D. Ill. March 8, 1991); 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. at 1032-33 (incorporat-
ing an "all that reasonably could have been expected" standard into the "knowledge"
prong of the innocent owner defense); Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. at 1299; United
States v. One 1985 BMW 318i, 696 F. Supp. 336, 339-40, 344 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Textually, it is difficult to read the additional requirement into § 881. Normally,
consent means a state of mind, and attendant activities are relevant only to the extent
that they indicate mental belief. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY explains, "Consent is an act
of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing as in balance the good and
evil on each side. It means voluntary agreement by a person in the possession and exer-
cise of sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice to do something proposed
by another." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 305 (6th ed. 1990). The Act gives no reason to
interpret the word "consent" any differently. See 107.9 Acre Parcel, 898 F.2d at 398;
United States v. Lots 12, 13, 14, and 15, Keeton Heights Subdivision, 869 F.2d 942, 947
(6th Cir. 1989); United States v. $4,250,000 in United States Currency, 762 F.2d 895,
906 n.24 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986); 8848 S. Commercial St., 757
F. Supp. at 880 n.10 ("Federal courts have typically relied upon Calero-Toledo as the au-
thority for an innocent ownership defense when the statutory provisions in question
made no allowances for the innocent owner. However, the authority for the innocent
ownership in this case is statutory .... [T]he statute makes no reference to the second
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require property owners to take positive steps to prevent any possi-
ble violation of the law.6 2 The Federal Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit explained, "Unless an owner with knowledge can prove
[that] every action, reasonable under the circumstances, was taken
to curtail the drug-related activity, consent is inferred and the prop-
erty is subject to forfeiture." 63 Citizens may be obligated to contin-
prong of the innocent ownership defense outlined in Calero-Toledo, i.e., the owner's rea-
sonable efforts to prevent the illegal activity from occurring.") (citations omitted);
United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Consisting of Approximately 4,657 Acres, 730
F. Supp. 423,427-28 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States v. 316 Units of Municipal Securities,
725 F. Supp. 172, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The statutory 'innocent owner' defense was
adopted after the judicial 'innocent owner' defense. While both are aimed at owners
whose property is used by another for an illegal purpose, the statutory defense lessened
the heavy burden established by the Supreme Court's Calero-Toledo decision. It requires
only a showing of ignorance of the illegal transactions.").
The innocent owner provisions for vehicle forfeitures also include a "willful blind-
ness" standard, requiring a higher threshold. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4). Willful blindness
can exist where consent and knowledge are lacking. See, e.g., United States v. 1988
Toyota Supra, No. 90-1345, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 223 (7th Cir.Jan. 7, 1991) (child was
a known cocaine addict, excessive mileage accumulated on the car and parent did not
know of any employment held by the child while child lived away from home). Even with
this wider reach, however, the "all that reasonably could have been done" standard goes
beyond the requirements of § 881. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines "willful blindness"
as: "[A] term used to refer to a situation where the defendant tries to avoid knowing
something that will incriminate. It is usually held in this situation that the defendant
'knows' anyway because he is aware of a high probability of existence." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra this note, at 1600.
62 In United States v. One 1987 Mercedes Benz Roadster 560 SEC, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2757, for example, a company car was used by an employee for business and
personal transportation. The employee ingested cocaine while in the car. The court
never reached the issues of whether the company's officers knew of or consented to drug
use by its employees. Rather, the problem was that no positive actions were taken by the
company to assure that drug use did not occur. The court authorized forfeiture, ex-
plaining that the company "[h]ad no corporate policy restricting illegal drug use by
company officers in company cars, nor were any measures taken to prevent such drug
use." Id. at *3.
Law enforcement officials have expressed the view that all property owners must
actively contribute to the war on drugs. An Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of
Columbia has stated, "The responsibility of the property owner is not substantially dif-
ferent than the responsibility of every citizen to cooperate with the police in the war on
drugs." H. Jane Lehman, Expanded War on Drugs May Threaten Landlords; Property Seizure
Activity Could Be Widened, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1990, at El. A representative of the
Illinois Association of Realtors explained the extra burden: "You are compelling...
property owner[s], in some cases, to place themselves physically at risk ... [by telling
owners] to turn these potentially dangerous people into the police or we are going to
take your property." Id. See also David J. Fried, Rationalizing Criminal Fofeiture, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 387 (1988); SusanJ. Parcels, An Analysis of Federal Drug-
Related Civil Fo reiture, 34 ME. L. REv. 435, 448 (1982). The positive steps requirement
is consistent with the view that civil forfeiture statutes are intended to establish a regime
of strict liability, encouraging property owners to take extreme precautions. See infra
notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
63 418 57th St., 922 F.2d at 132. See also 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. at 1033
("The civil forfeiture statute makes owners, including lessors, responsible for their
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ually warn dependents and guests about the illegality of drug
transactions, 64 to search through personal belongings of family
members, to inquire into the criminal record of friends and business
acquaintances,6 5 and even to turn in spouses and children to the
police.66 Property owners must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that they have taken appropriate action in order to prevail
at a civil forfeiture hearing.
F. REMISSION OR MITIGATION UNDER § 881
The opportunity for remission or mitigation also provides pro-
tection.67 Under the relevant customs laws, a claimant may file a
petition for remission or mitigation with the Attorney General. The
Attorney General may return the property if he or she finds that the
"[f]orfeiture was incurred without wilful negligence or without any
intention on the part of the petitioner to defraud the revenue or to
violate the law, or finds the existence of such mitigating
circumstances." 68
The remission procedure allows one to deal with the issue ad-
ministratively, but it does not compensate for the shifted burden of
property. Owners must take 'basic investigatory steps' and not deliberately avoid knowl-
edge of wrongdoing on the property.").
64 See United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015,
1033 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
65 See 28 C.F.R. 9.5 (b)(4); United States v. 31-33 York St., 930 F.2d 139, 140-41 (2d
Cir. 1991) ("Evidence of appellant's son's arrests on drug charges is certainly relevant to
whether appellant knew that narcotics activity was taking place at [the property] or was
an innocent owner."); One 1987 Mercedes Benz Roadster 560 SEC, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2757 at *13-14; 418 57th St., 737 F. Supp. at 751-52;J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal
Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 480
(1976) ("[R]easonable care has apparently consisted of inquiring into the criminal rec-
ord and reputation of lessees, mortgagors, buyers of goods subject to security interests,
and other persons likely to use the property."); Fried, supra note 62, at 387.
66 See United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowa County, 930 F.2d 857, 860 (11th Cir.
1991) (obligation to act against spouse even after threats of physical violence); 31-33
York St., 930 F.2d at 140-41 (suggesting obligation to act against children); United States
v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618, 665 (3d Cir. 1989) (Greenberg, J., dissenting) ("I
appreciate the fact that enforcement of the forfeiture laws may produce discord in some
marriages since to preserve her property rights, a wife may have to advise the authorities
of the activities of her husband."); United States v. One 1985 BMW 318i, 696 F. Supp.
336, 344-45 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (suggesting obligation to act against spouse).
67 21 U.S.C. § 881(d).
68 16 U.S.C. § 1618 (1992). The customs laws dictate that the Secretary of the Treas-
ury make such determinations, but § 881(d) provides the Attorney General with the au-
thority when forfeitures are made pursuant to the Act.
19 U.S.C. § 1613 (1992) provides for "[r]emission of the forfeiture and restoration
of the proceeds of such sale" if the property has already been sold. The petition for
remission must be made within three months of the sale. Id.
Department of Justice's "Criteria Governing Remission and Mitigation" give addi-
tional guidance:
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proof. In a petition for remission or mitigation, the burden of proof
remains on the claimant. The Attorney General even assumes that
the initial showing of probable cause has been made.69 Further-
more, the decision to grant full or partial remission is completely
discretionary and outside the jurisdiction of any court.70 If the gov-
ernment insists on pursuing a forfeiture, the petition for remission
or mitigation provides minimal protection.
III. THE CONSTITUTION AND BURDENS OF PROOF
U.S. courts traditionally require a high standard of proof when
the government accuses and threatens a person with a significant
deprivation. Our society cherishes the principle that all persons are
innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Supreme Court has flatly stated, "[p]roof of a criminal charge be-
yond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required." 71
(a) The Determining Official shall not consider whether the evidence is suffi-
cient to support the forfeiture but shall presume a valid forfeiture.
(b) Remission. The Determining Official shall not remit a forfeiture unless the
petitioner establishes: (1) That petitioner has a valid, good faith interest in the
seized property as owner or otherwise; and (2) That petitioner had no knowledge
that the property in which petitioner claims an interest was or would be involved in
any violation of the law; and (3) That petitioner had no knowledge of the particular
violation which subjected the property to seizure and forfeiture; and (4) That peti-
tioner had no knowledge that the user of the property had any record for violating
laws of the U.S. or of any State for a related crime; and (5) That petitioner had taken
all reasonable steps to prevent the illegal use of the property.
(c) Mitigation. In addition to having the discretionary authority to grant relief
by way of complete remission of forfeiture, the determining official may, in the exer-
cise of discretion, mitigate forfeitures of seized property. This authority may be
exercised in those cases where the petitioner has not met the minimum conditions
precedent to remission but where there are present other extenuating circum-
stances indicating that some relief should be granted to avoid extreme hardship.
28 C.F.R. § 9.5(a)-(c) (1990).
69 See 28 C.F.R. § 9.5(a)-(b) (quoted supra note 68); 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 625.
70 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 625; United States v. $41,305 in Currency and Trav-
eler's Checks, 802 F.2d 1339, 1346 n.13 (lth Cir. 1986); United States v. One 1973
Buick Riviera, 560 F.2d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. One 1972 Mercedes
Benz 250, 545 F.2d 1233, 1236 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. One 1972 Toyota Mark
II, 505 F.2d 1162, 1165 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera Sedan,
463 F.2d 1168, 1170 (5th Cir. 1972) ("The question of our authority to review the Attor-
ney General's denial of the request for remission of the forfeiture is controlled by the
long-standing, judge-made rule that the Attorney General has unreviewable discretion
over petitions under [the remission and mitigation provisions of the customs laws].").
71 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 357, 362 (1970). See also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 763 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24
(1979) ("In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the defendant are of such
magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they
have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the
likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In the administration of criminal justice, our soci-
ety imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by requiring
under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a
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Despite constitutional questions, U.S. courts have uniformly
upheld the constitutionality of procedures shifting the burden of
proof in civil forfeiture proceedings. Although most courts apply-
ing § 881 have not examined the constitutional implications of the
issue, courts that have rejected constitutional challenges have relied
on the distinction between civil and criminal cases. 72
Burdens of proof illustrate the way our society wishes to allo-
cate the risk of a mistake by a court. As civil cases generally involve
interests of a lesser magnitude than those at stake in criminal pro-
ceedings, our society is willing to tolerate a higher risk of error in
civil cases. The Supreme Court explained:
The rule of evidence requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
generally applicable only in strictly criminal proceedings. It is
founded upon the reason that a greater degree of probability should
be required as a ground ofjudgment in criminal cases, which affect life
or liberty, than may safely be adopted in cases where civil rights are
only ascertained. 7"
Merely labeling a procedure as civil in nature does not elimi-
nate the possibility that the interests involved necessitate a higher
reasonable doubt."); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
72 United States v. 418 57th St., 922 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Because it is a
civil statute, § 881 imparts comparatively few of the traditional due process guarantees
that attach upon criminal indictment. Individuals not involved in criminal activity may
forfeit ownership based solely on a showing of probable cause that their property has
been involved in some aspect of the drug trade."); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d
1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808
F.2d 895, 900 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689
F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65, 66
(9th Cir. 1976); Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir. 1974). The Third
Circuit has implied that it would reach this conclusion. United States v. Sandini, 816
F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987).
But see United States v. United States Currency, 626 F.2d 11, 18 (6th Cir. 1980)
(Merritt, J., concurring) ("[T]he forfeiture of cash here is a penalty predicated upon a
finding of the owner's wrongful conduct .... We must therefore instruct the District
Court that it must afford claimant the same safeguards he would be afforded in any other
criminal trial. This includes the presumption of innocence [and] proof beyond a reason-
able doubt."); United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., 760 F. Supp.
1015, 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("On constitutional as well as policy grounds there is doubt
about the propriety of shifting the burden of proof in quasi-criminal proceedings to
leaseholders. Characterizing this action as civil by statute does not negate its essentially
punitive nature as part of the broad initiatives to combat drugs."). The majority opinion
by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. United States Currency concerned the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination when a criminal prosecution was occurring si-
multaneously with a civil forfeiture action. The majority opinion never discussed the
appropriate burden of proof in forfeiture proceedings. United States Currency, 626 F.2d at
11-17.
73 United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 49 (1914) (quoting Roberge v. Burnham, 124
Mass. 277, 278 (1878)). See also Addington, 441 U.S. at 423; Speiser, 357 U.S. at 525-26.
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burden of proof. In In re Winship,74 for example, the Supreme Court
applied the Due Process Clause's requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt to juvenile proceedings. The Court characterized
such proceedings as civil, since they purport "not to punish, but to
save the child."'75 Despite the remedial justification, however, the
Court required a higher burden of proof because the interests at
stake were deemed to be comparable to those of a criminal
defendant. 76
As in the case of juveniles facing delinquency determinations,
claimants contesting forfeitures stand to lose substantial interests. 77
Given the huge impact of civil forfeiture actions under § 881 and
the courts' rejection of constitutional claims arising out of the shift
of the burden of proof, one must wonder what distinguishes civil
from criminal cases. 78
74 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 357.
75 Id. at 365 (quoting In re Family Court, 247 N.E.2d 253, 254 (N.Y. 1969)).
76 Id. at 366-67.
77 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
78 Another way of going about the problem is to acknowledge the "civil" nature of a
§ 881 action and to litigate the Due Process Clause's protections in civil cases. The
government's burden in a criminal case involving the Due Process Clause requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof required in a civil action depends
upon an application of the Mathews test:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires considera-
tion of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute pro-
cedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In Addington v. Texas, for example, the
Supreme Court applied the Mathews test when analyzing the risks of an erroneous deci-
sion in a civil commitment proceeding. Although civil commitment proceedings are civil
in form and have the ostensibly remedial purposes of protecting the mentally ill and the
public, the Court concluded that the Due Process Clause requires "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence before commitment is permissible. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
433 (1979).
Even if a high burden of proof is appropriate in some civil settings, the Court is
reluctant to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in non-criminal actions. The
Court has explained, "[T]he 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard historically has been
reserved for criminal cases. This unique standard of proof, not prescribed or defined in
the Constitution, is regarded as a critical part of the 'moral force of the criminal law,'
and we should hesitate to apply it too broadly or casually in noncriminal cases." Adding-
ton, 441 U.S. at 428. Instead, civil actions are traditionally judged by a preponderance of
the evidence standard. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 357, 368-69 (1970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 49 (1914) ("[Tlhe general rule applicable to
civil suits [is] that proof by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence is sufficient.")
(quoting Roberge v. Burnham, 124 Mass. 277, 278 (1878)).
In § 881 forfeiture actions, the government has an even greater advantage than
traditional civil litigants; the government need only establish probable cause. The Fed-
eral Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recognized the incongruity:
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IV. THE HISTORICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
FORFEITURES
Historically, U.S. courts have distinguished between forfeiture
actions in personam and forfeiture actions in rem. Litigation pursued
against owners of property has been treated as criminal in nature.
In these cases, the issue is the personal guilt or innocence of the
owner, and forfeiture becomes a punishment of that individual. Ac-
tions against property have been labeled civil. In these cases, courts
operate under the assumption that the issue is the guilt or inno-
cence of the property itself.79
There is disagreement over the exact origin of the formalistic
The civil forfeiture statute does, indeed, give the government substantial proce-
dural advantages not enjoyed by litigants in other types of civil cases. Most signifi-
cantly, the government in a civil forfeiture action need not prove that the defendant
property was, in fact, involved in advancing a drug transaction. As noted above, the
government need only show that there is probable cause to believe that such is the
case; the burden then shifts to the claimant to disprove the proposition.
United States v. Lot 4, Block 5 of Eaton Acres, 904 F.2d 487, 491 (9th Cir. 1990).
Applying the Mathews test, § 881 forfeitures should demand a higher standard of
proof than probable cause. First, claimants in § 881 actions stand to lose significant
interests. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. Second, a probable cause stan-
dard provides the most minimal of protections. Burdens of proof dictate the certainty
with which guilt is established, thereby directly affecting the risk of erroneous depriva-
tions. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Finally, the government normally faces
a preponderance of the evidence standard in civil actions. No special administrative
needs exist to lessen that burden in § 881 litigation. Given the lack of special govern-
ment interests and the risks of erroneous deprivation of property, the government
should bear the burden of proving its case by at least a preponderance of the evidence in
order to affect a § 881 forfeiture. See United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nos-
trand Ave., 760 F. Supp. 1015, 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. Veon, 538 F.
Supp. 237, 247 (E.D. Cal. 1982); Petrov, supra note 60, at 838-39; Parcels, supra note 62,
at 458.
79 In the context of a § 881 forfeiture, the Seventh Circuit has explained:
In many cases forfeiture is a harsh and oppressive procedure, depriving innocent
owners of their property because it was used by other persons for unlawful pur-
poses .... The seemingly harsh rule which permits condemnation of the [property]
without regard to the owner's culpability, is explained by the fact that historically
forfeiture is a civil proceeding in rem. The vehicle or other inanimate object is
treated as being itself guilty of wrongdoing, regardless of its owner's conduct.
United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 454 (7th Cir. 1980). See
also United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. 1295, 1297 (W.D. Ark. 1990). The
American legal system adopted the admiralty model when implementing forfeiture pro-
visions. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d at 459-61; United States v. 38 Whalers
Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). The first Congress levied customs
duties and established forfeiture as an enforcement mechanism. The burden of proof
was shifted in the original customs act adopted in 1789 as well as in prior resolutions of
the Continental Congress. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d at 461. In 1827, for
example, the Supreme Court described the seizure of a pirate vessel as a civil forfeiture.
The ship was labelled the offender rather than the pirates. Justice Field emphasized the
distinction: "The thing is the instrument of wrong, and is forfeited by reason of the
unlawful use made of it, or the unlawful condition in which it is placed . ...
[P]roceedings in rem [are] wholly independent of, and unaffected by, the criminal pro-
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distinction between civil and criminal forfeitures. Some argue that
modern forfeiture law is the heir of the common law of deodand. At
common law, property that caused death or great injury was consid-
ered to have committed an offense against God. The sovereign
could forfeit the property, ostensibly for the purpose contributing
the assets to the common good in the form of charitable donations
or masses for the victim's soul.8 0
Other sources trace the origin of forfeiture distinctions to an
independently developed British admiralty law. In the seventeenth
century, Great Britain became the premier maritime power. At least
two difficulties arose with applying the common law to disputes be-
tween maritime traders. First, the owner of the property in question
was often living in a foreign country, personally beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the court. Second, ships and their cargo frequently belonged
to several merchants, so that an independent action would have be
litigated against each individual with an interest in the assets.
Courts developed an admiralty law separate from the common law
to govern trade with other nations. The in rem classification eased
commercial litigation by allowing simply one legal action over assets
that are geographically within the jurisdiction of the court. 81
Neither historical basis explains the lesser level of protection
afforded claimants in § 881 actions. The concept of deodand hardly
necessitated a lower standard of proof. The divergent burdens
might be explained by the independence of the admiralty courts
from the precedent of the common law, as well as the emphasis on
speedy dispositions to satisfy their merchant "customers." 8 2 Cur-
rently, however, law enforcement officials need not receive an ad-
vantage in terms of burdens of proof in order to avoid the
requirement of filing claims against foreign or multiple owners.
ceedings against the person." Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 321-22 (1871) (Field,
J., dissenting).
80 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679-81 (1974);
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971); United States
v. Seifuddin, 820 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d
869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987) ("In rem procedures enjoy a venerable history and existed in
Mosaic law if not in other ancient codes as well. Blackstone speaks of the Biblical rule:
'When an ox gore a man or a woman to death, the ox must be stoned; its flesh may not
be eaten.' In medieval times, the law of deodands required forfeiture of a chattel that
had caused the death of a person."); Clark, supra note 65, at 476; OLIVER W. HOLMES,
JR., THE COMMON LAw 24-30 (1881); Note, 88 COLUM. L. REV. at 390-91.
81 See 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. at 177; George F. Steckley, Merchants and the
Admiralty Court During the English Revolution, 22 AM.J. LEGAL HIsT. 137, 151, 171 (1978);
Michael Schecter, Note, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 CORNELL L. REV.
1151, 1153-54 (1990); Petrov, supra note 60, at 825-26.
82 Steckley, supra note 81, at 172.
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Furthermore, even if private civil plaintiffs were given procedural
advantages to promote commercial trade, the government does not
need these advantages.
Whatever the original impetus, the American legal system has
been willing to accept the in personam/in rem line as the basis for dis-
tinguishing between "criminal" and "civil" forfeitures. The U.S.
Supreme Court has repeatedly employed the distinction throughout
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 83
Courts have often characterized civil forfeitures as remedial be-
cause their concern was whether the property had injured others,
not whether any individual was morally culpable. In Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. ,84 the Supreme Court approved the seizure
of a yacht without any prior warning to the owners. The Court
claimed that the forfeiture "[f]oster[ed] the public interest in
preventing continued illicit use of the property."8 5 The aim of the
forfeiture proceeding was not to punish the owner.
The Supreme Court has also implied that civil forfeiture stat-
utes establish schemes of strict liability. Warned by the existence of
such a statute, the owner should take special precautions to prevent
any illegal use of the property.8 6 The Court explained: "[C]ongress
interposes the care and responsibility of [the property] owners in
aid of the prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions, by
ascribing to the property a certain personality, a power of complicity
and guilt in the wrong."87
Regardless of the rationale, the civil label has been so consist-
83 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974); Gold-
smith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 504, 513 (1921); United States v. Stowell,
133 U.S. 1, 12 (1889); Dobbins' Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 399 (1877); The
Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 14 (1827).
84 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. 663.
85 Id. at 679; see also Stowell, 133 U.S. at 12 ("By now the settled doctrine of this court,
statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are considered as enacted for the public
good and to suppress a public wrong, and therefore, although they impose penalties or
forfeitures, not to be construed, like penal laws generally, strictly in favor of the defend-
ant, but they are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of
the legislature.").
86 See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 687-88 ("To the extent that such forfeiture provisions
are applied to lessors, bailors, or secured creditors who are innocent of any wrongdoing,
confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing them to exercise greater care in
transferring possession of their property."); Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 510-11;
Clark, supra note 65, at 477-78. The same argument has been forwarded in the context
of § 881 actions. See, e.g., United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. 1295, 1299
(W.D. Ark. 1990).
87 Goldsmith-Grant Co., 254 U.S. at 510-11. The strict liability rationale appears to be
criminal rather than civil in nature. First, the incentive for an owner to use "greater
care" is the loss of the property - a deterrent. Additionally, a strict liability rationale
impliedly condemns the actions (or inactions) of the individual owner. Forfeitures based
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ently applied to certain forfeitures that the historical distinction has
taken on a life of its own. Quoting the Supreme Court, the Federal
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has reasoned, "However in-
applicable its original justification may be today, in rem, or civil for-
feiture, has become 'too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial
jurisprudence of the country to now be displaced.' "88 The Ninth
Circuit has similarly emphasized the mindlessness of the distinction:
Critics of the law may well ask why the law requires proportionality
review for forfeitures when the government proceeds in personam, but
not when the government proceeds in rem. The two proceedings are
functionally equivalent (except when the res is contraband) and differ
only in form. But the historical development of the two actions has led
courts to continue the fiction that in rem proceedings are against the
res, rather than against the individual, even when the result is to create
new members of the homeless. Given the Supreme Court's willing-
ness to underwrite this historical fiction, it is difficult to deny the gov-
ernment's conclusion that the Eighth Amendment's proportionality
review requirement does not apply. "The life of the law has not been
logic: it has been experience." 8 9
Despite the large amount of precedent supporting the civil la-
bel, one must wonder why it persists. Forfeitures of personal resi-
dences (even public housing leaseholds) are extreme evidence of
the absurdity of the civil label. The government, after determining
that a violation of penal laws has occurred, takes a person's home
away. The historical acceptance of a formalistic distinction cannot
justify the lack of procedural protections that would be afforded if in
rem forfeitures were labelled criminal.
First, American courts have not consistently accepted the in per-
sonam/in rem difference as a means of indicating whether a forfeiture
is civil or criminal in nature. The Supreme Court stated in Boyd v.
United States:
[P]roceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of
a man's property by reason of offences committed by him, though they
may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal. In this very case, the
ground of forfeiture . .. consists of certain acts of fraud committed
against the public revenue in relation to imported merchandise, which
are made criminal by the state .... As, therefore, suits for penalties and
forfeitures incurred by the commission of offences against the law, are of this quasi-
criminal nature, we think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings
for all purposes of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and of that por-
on personal conduct are classified as in personam, not in rem. See Fried, supra note 62, at
386.
88 United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Goldsmith-Grant
Co., 254 U.S. at 511) (citations omitted).
89 United States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232, 234-35 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations
omitted) (quoting HOLMES, supra note 80, at 1).
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tion of the Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.90
The Court, by declaring in rem forfeiture statutes to be quasi-crimi-
nal, has selectively made possible application of some criminal pro-
cedure protections and rejection of others. Thus, the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches, 9' the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination 92 and the Due
Process Clause's guarantee of speedy trial93 have been applied to
civil forfeiture schemes. For the purposes of other procedural pro-
tections, the Court has characterized in rem forfeitures as civil and
has relaxed the standards. 94 The Court refused to apply the Double
90 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886).
91 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 691, 701 (1965); Boyd, 116
U.S. at 634; United States v. $277,000 in United States Currency, 941 F.2d 898, 902 (9th
Cir. 1991) (evidence excluded in § 881 forfeiture action when police lacked probable
cause to search an automobile); United States v. One 1979 Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666
F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1982).
The Fourth Amendment is, however, not applied in § 881 cases with the same vigor
as in traditional criminal prosecutions. Some also argue that the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable seizures is not applied with as much force as the prohi-
bition against unreasonable searches. See Michael E. Herz, Note, Fooreiture Seizures and the
Warrant Requirement, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 960, 990-91 (1981). The Supplemental Admi-
ralty Rules and the provisions of § 881 provide mechanisms by which the government
may seize property without a warrant, even if exigent circumstances do not exist. Many
courts interpreting § 881 have permitted seizures without warrants. See supra notes 23-
28 and accompanying text. The Third Circuit has noted, "[T]he body of law relating to
unlawful searches, arrests and seizures in criminal proceedings is without impact in a
libel for forfeiture action which is an in rem proceeding." United States v. $1,058 in
United States Currency, 323 F.2d 211, 213 (3d Cir. 1963). Although it decided this case
before the Supreme Court's decision in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. 691, the Third
Circuit subsequently cited the decision to justify warrantless seizures pursuant to § 88 1.
United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1981)
("[I]t has long been established in this Circuit that a warrant is not required for seizure
in a forfeiture action .... The only requirement for a seizure in a forfeiture action is
probable cause. Accordingly, the [§ 881] (b)(4) exception allowing a warrantless seizure
where supported by probable cause does not offend the Fourth Amendment.").
Several observers have criticized the exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g.,
Schecter, supra note 81, at 1168-75; Parcels, supra note 62, at 449-53; Herz, supra this
note, at 960; Note, The Forfeiture Exception to the Warrant Requirement: A Distinction Without a
Difference, 67 VA. L. REV. 1035 (1981).
92 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634; United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 722
(1971). In Calero-Toledo, the Court attempted to limit its decision in United States Coin &
Currency. The Calero-Toledo Court argued that the forfeiture statute in United States Coin &
Currency was truly criminal in nature, and constitutional procedural protections might
not apply to a forfeiture statute that is truly civil in nature. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 688-89 (1974).
93 United States v. $8,850 in United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 556 (1983) (ap-
plying Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to an 18-month delay in filing a civil forfei-
ture proceeding).
94 See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 12 ("The strict rules of the common law as to criminal
prosecutions, have never been supposed by this Court to be required in informations of
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Jeopardy Clause95 and the Sixth Amendment's right to confronta-
tion96 to in rem forfeiture proceedings. Additionally, lower courts
adjudicating § 881 actions have chosen not to apply the Ex Post
Facto Clause,97 the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment98 and the Due Process Clause's require-
ment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt99 to in rem forfeiture pros-
ecutions. As one court explained,
[C]ongress may alter the traditional allocation of the burden of proof
without infringing upon the litigant's due process rights unless the
statute is criminal in nature. Although the Supreme Court has consid-
ered forfeiture statutes as criminal for the purpose of protecting cer-
tain fourth and fifth amendment rights, they are predominantly civil in
nature. The Supreme Court, recognizing the historic civil nature of
seizure in the Admiralty for forfeitures, which are deemed to be civil proceedings in
rem.).
95 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984)
("[N]either collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy bars a civil, remedial forfeiture pro-
ceeding initiated following an acquittal on related criminal charges.") (unanimous deci-
sion); One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-36 (1972) ("If
for no other reason, the forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two criminal trials nor two criminal punish-
ments .... Forfeiture under [the statute] is a civil sanction."); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391, 399-400 (1937). These precedents have been applied to § 881. See, e.g.,
United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
96 United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896). As a practical matter, courts
adjudicating § 881 actions substantially diminish any right to confrontation by interpret-
ing the requirement of proof by probable cause as being satisfied by hearsay. See United
States v. One 1986 Chevrolet Van, 927 F.2d 39, 42 (Ist Cir. 1991); United States v. 28
Emery St., 914 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d
213, 217 n.3 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808
F.2d 895, 900 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. $5,644,540 in United States Currency,
799 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. 1982 Yukon Delta Houseboat, 774
F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. One 56 Foot Yacht Named Tahuna,
702 F.2d 1276, 1282 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. One 1974 Porsche 91 l-S, 682 F.2d
283, 286 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 738 F. Supp. 854, 857
(D.NJ. 1990), rev'don other grounds, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Route 2,
Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (W.D. Ark. 1990). Additionally, the government's
privilege of withholding the identity of informants is stronger in the civil setting. One
1986 Chevrolet Van, 927 F.2d at 43. Thus, the claimant is not only refused an opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses, but is kept ignorant of who is making the accusation. Fur-
ther complicating the situation, claimants are not permitted to rely on hearsay when
proving their cases. See infra note 54.
97 United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532, 544-45 (5th Cir. 1987)
("Because § 881 is, therefore, in both purpose and effect primarily a remedial, civil for-
feiture provision, we hold that the cc post facto clause of the Constitution does not apply
to it."); $5,644,540 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d at 1364 n.8 ("The ex post facto
clause, however, applies only to criminal cases, and we are dealing with a civil forfei-
ture.") (citations omitted).
98 United States v. 3097 S.W. 111th Ave., 921 F.2d 1551, 1554 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. 300 Cove
Rd., 861 F.2d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1988).
99 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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forfeiture statutes has repeatedly refused to limit their application by
imposing the full range of constitutional protections usually associated
with criminal sanctions.100
The formalistic distinction between civil and criminal forfeit-
ures does not make up an unbroken line of precedent. If the consis-
tent use of a common law doctrine justifies ignoring the
Constitution, as some courts have implied, 10' the in personam/in rem
rationale in forfeiture law does not merit such holy treatment.
Further, if the mechanistic in personam/in rem distinction is the
sole basis for declining to apply the Due Process Clause, then the
rationale for declaring a forfeiture proceeding civil becomes implau-
sibly circular. Objects do not possess free will and cannot by them-
selves violate the law. Forfeitures of objects are based on the
activities of people who are personally affected by the loss of their
property. The in rem label is merely a legal fiction that imposes pun-
ishment upon proof of criminal conduct.
A history of mistreatment hardly sanctifies continued abuse.
The Supreme Court has criticized unthoughtful reliance on historic
traditions in the area of forfeitures: "Even Blackstone, who is not
known as a biting critic of the English legal tradition, condemned
the seizure of the property of the innocent as based upon a 'super-
stition' inherited from the 'blind days' of feudalism."' 0 2
100 $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d at 900. See also United States v. Seifud-
din, 820 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529
F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1976) ("Forfeiture statutes are deemed criminal for the purpose of
protecting rights secured by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments (Boyd v. United States), but
they are predominantly civil. Despite some dicta attacking their civil characterization
(United States v. United States Coin & Currency), the Supreme Court has firmly refused to
broaden the criminal aspect of forfeiture so as to encompass a wider range of constitu-
tional protections.") (citations omitted); Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 973
(10th Cir. 1974).
101 E.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681-83 (1974);
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 504, 511 (1921); United States v.
Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 (3d Cir. 1987).
102 United States v. U.S. Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1971). In a different
context, the Supreme Court has declared, "[N]o one acquires a vested or protected right
in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our
entire nation's existence and indeed predicates it." Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York,
397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 718 (1984) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) ("[H]istorical acceptance of a particular practice alone is never suffi-
cient to justify a challenged government action.").
The Federal District Court for the District of Colorado has voiced similar concerns
when enforcing § 881:
While forfeiture actions lend little, if anything, to intelligent discourse or estab-
lished notions of fair play, the facts presented simply fail to provide any means by
which the intervenor can escape their maw. [The claimant] may find some solace in
knowing that this absurdity is not of modern invention but one which has its roots in
medieval superstition and druidism.
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The American legal system has extended the superstition much
further than did the courts in Blackstone's time. Civil forfeiture of
real estate as an instrumentality of crime did not exist at common
law.' 03 The historic explanations cannot justify current forfeiture
law. Rather than relying on unthoughtful traditions to justify for-
feitures under § 881, courts should apply constitutional principles
to condemn them.
V. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
BY THE GOVERNMENT
A. SEVERITY OF THE IMPOSITION
The severity of the imposition is important in determining
whether a prosecution is civil or criminal. The rationale for requir-
ing proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases rests partly
on the significance of the potential loss.' 0 4 In Speiser v. Randall,'0 5
Justice Brennan described the importance of protecting any "inter-
est of transcending value,"' 0 6 referring to the liberty of a criminal
defendant as but one example of such an interest. Similarly, the
Court seems to condition the rights to counsel and jury trial on the
United States v. One 1976 Buick Skylark, 453 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D. Colo. 1978). See also
United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Fried,
supra note 62, at 382-83.
103 Examples given by Holmes include wild animals, falling trees, run-away carriages
and a steam engine. HOLMES, supra note 80, at 24-26. Other historical interpretations
have mentioned domesticated animals, ships and merchandise on ships. See Calero-To-
ledo, 416 U.S. at 681-83. The common law did permit the forfeiture of real property
upon a finding of guilt in a criminal case, but these actions were in personam. Calero-
Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682; Fried, supra note 62, at 329 n.1. The American legal system
rejected this notion of criminal forfeiture. The Federal Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has noted:
Criminal forfeiture of property was disfavored during this country's infancy. The
Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117, stated that "no conviction or judg-
ment. . .shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate." The statutory
proscription rejected the traditional forfeiture of all of a felon's property even if it
had no connection with the crime. The colonists' experience with the English law of
forfeiture created an antipathy toward its use, which was reflected in its prohibition
by the First Congress.
Sandini, 816 F.2d at 873. See also, Fried, supra note 62, at 329 n.1.
Some support does exist for allowing in rem forfeiture of permanent structures on
property. Holmes gave the example of a falling house, claiming that the critical element
of an in rem forfeiture is the motion of the "guilty" object. Holmes explained, "A maxim
of Henry Spigurnel, a judge of the time of Edward I, is reported, that 'where a man is
killed by a cart, or by the fall of a house, or in other like manner, and the thing in motion
is the cause of the death, it shall be deodand.' " HOLMES, supra note 80, at 25. Unless an
earthquake causes a drug violation, however, the historic rationale cannot justify a § 881
action against real property.
104 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
105 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
106 Id at 525.
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level of punishment. 0 7 As the Sixth Amendment guarantees these
protections in all criminal prosecutions, 0 8 the petty/non-petty of-
fense distinction shows the importance of severity in identifying
criminal cases.
Many forfeitures would qualify as criminal under a severity test.
Significant interests are at stake in forfeiture proceedings. 0 9 De-
spite the appeal of this rationale, however, the harshness of the for-
feiture alone cannot decide the issue. A criminal fine in the same
amount as a civil forfeiture involves additional considerations. In
most instances, a criminal conviction also signifies personal respon-
sibility or moral wrongdoing. The government labels a sanction
criminal to achieve objectives other than only remedial ones." t0
Decisions that stress the form of punishment are not so clear.
In Baldwin v. New York, the basis for the petty/non-petty distinction
concerned society's evaluation of the defendant's conduct. The
level of punishment served merely as a proxy."' Thus, the defend-
ant might be entitled to a jury even if the potential punishment is
less than six months in prison, depending on the level of moral
blameworthiness associated with a conviction."12
Examples can serve to demonstrate the limited relevance of the
severity inquiry. If a herd of cattle contracts a contagious disease,
107 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66,
69 (1970) ("[N]o offense can be deemed 'petty' for purposes of the right to trial by jury
where imprisonment for more than six months is authorized.").
108 U.S. CONST. amend VI.
109 See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 718 (1971)
("From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference between a man who
'forfeits' $8,674 because he has used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man
who pays a 'criminal fine' of $8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct."); United
States v. United States Currency, 626 F.2d 11, 18 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merritt, J., concur-
ring). Butsee United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir.
1982).
110 See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
111 Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68 ("In deciding whether an offense is 'petty,' we have sought
objective criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society regards the offense, and
we have found the most relevant such criteria in the severity of the maximum authorized
penalty.").
112 Professors LaFave and Israel have explained the limits of Baldwin:
Well before Baldwin the Supreme Court had refused to view the maximum potential
sentence as the sole criterion for determining whether or not an offense was petty
for jury trial purposes. Rather, the Court looked to the nature of the offense, con-
sidering such factors as whether it was indictable at common law, whether it was
morally offensive, and whether it was malum in se rather than malum prohibitum.
Baldwin has been read as leaving these decisions undisturbed to the extent that they
provide an additional basis for finding an offense to be other than petty. Conse-
quently, courts have held, despite the low penalty involved, that such crimes as con-
spiracy to deceive immigration officials, driving under the influence and shoplifting
fall within the jury trial guarantee.
WAYNE LAFAVE &JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 827 (1985).
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the government might require the owner to slaughter the herd.
Although the cattle herder would lose a valuable asset, no social
stigma or blame would result. Losing one's principal business as-
sets would not trigger the requirement of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.' 13 Conversely, murder would probably remain a crime
even if the only punishment were a public declaration of guilt and
the levy of a one-cent fine. Harsh punishment alone is not the
benchmark for declaring a prosecution criminal.
B. STIGMA FROM THE IMPOSITION
One court has argued that § 881 forfeitures should be treated
as civil because the civil label per se avoids the stigma associated with
criminal convictions. The Second Circuit reasoned:
Historically, forfeitures have always been regarded as civil. This his-
toric civil designation accurately reflects society's view that criminal
judgments are of a fundamentally different character. Applicants for
employment are often asked if they have been convicted of crimes;
rarely, if ever, are they required to disclose judgments of forfeiture.
The same distinction is observed on innumerable other questionnaires
and applications that people fill out in the course of everyday life.
Similarly, while the term "convicted felon" is a commonplace in our
vernacular, no such pejorative term has arisen to describe the victims
of forfeiture judgments.1 14
Although stigma may be a factor in deciding whether an action
is criminal, this analysis puts the cart before the horse. By defining
the civil label as not attaching stigma, the court defines whether a
proceeding is criminal based on the name of the government impo-
sition rather than an analysis of whether the forfeiture of property
itself is stigmatizing.
A penalty imposed under a civil scheme may be just as stigma-
tizing as a criminal conviction. 1 5 If a potential employer somehow
discovered that a job applicant's home had been forfeited due to
alleged cocaine sales, the employer would not likely hire the
113 SeeJonathan Charney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Pen-
alty Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 504 (1974).
114 United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1982)
(citations omitted). See also Charney, supra note 113, at 512-13.
115 Professor Clark has written:
[T]here may be cases of civil punishment that communicate a greater amount of
stigma than certain cases of punishment labeled criminal. A large civil penalty im-
posed for intentional failure to comply with anti-pollution laws, for example, may
stigmatize the defendant considerably more than would a small fine labeled "crimi-
nal" imposed for a traffic offense. And as the use of civil penalties proliferates, the
public may come to associate them with the commission of serious, morally wrong
acts in many cases.




Just as severity alone is not determinative, however, neither is
stigma. Even if a prosecution results in moral blame, the nature and
purpose of the imposition are relevant to the inquiry. A civil prose-
cution against a pollution dumper is one example.' 17 If the goal of
the prosecution is not the imposition of punishment but the restora-
tion of the environment, the suit is civil regardless of public percep-
tions of the perpetrator.
Neither severity nor stigma alone will suffice to label a forfei-
ture criminal. Such a determination must be made with reference to
the moral blame associated with, and the purposes of, the prosecu-
tion. The Supreme Court has developed a systematic way of analyz-
ing these elements.
C. THE WARD 1 18 TEST AND THE MENDOZA-MARTINEZ1 1 9 FACTORS
In United States v. Ward, the Supreme Court addressed a Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination challenge to a self-reporting provi-
sion in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 120 The Court held
that the self-reporting provision was civil, and that the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee against self-incrimination did not therefore ap-
ply. 12 1 The Court arrived at this conclusion by applying a two-part
test:
First, we have set out to determine whether Congress, in establishing
the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a
116 The scenario is not so absurd as to be unbelievable. The names and addresses of
claimants in civil forfeiture actions are routinely published in local newspapers. See Matt
O'Connor, Drug Asset Sales Pay Offfor Chicago, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9, 1991, § 2 at 11; Jim
Doyle, U.S. Seizes Home of Couple in Heroin Bust, S.F. CHRON., July 6, 1991, at Al1; Sean P.
Murphy, U.S. Seizes 14 Properties of Suspected Drug Landlord, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 1991,
at 31; U.S. Seizes Farm With Alleged Pot Crop, Cm. TRIB., May 24, 1991, § 1 at 3; Ronald L.
Soble, Seized Assets Underwrite the War on Drugs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1991, at A3; 6 Alleged
Drug Dealers Told They'll Be Evicted From CHA, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, June 27, 1990, at 22. To
take a particularly egregious example, a local newspaper in New Bedford, Massachu-
setts, publishes photographs of every person appearing in the New Bedford district
court on drug-related charges. Demonstrating the stigmatizing effect of the paper's
"Drug Watch" feature, the New Bedford Housing Authority has initiated eviction pro-
ceedings and turned down applicants based solely on the photographs. The executive
director of the Housing Authority has explained, "We're not a criminal court so we
don't need absolute proof. It's up to them to prove to us that they can be a good neigh-
bor." Mark Starr, A New Kind of Scarlet Letter, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 1991, at 75.
117 See supra note 115. Civil prosecutions directed at dangerous prescription drugs,
poorly designed automobiles or any other number of unsafe products could result in
stigma.
118 United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
119 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
120 Ward, 448 U.S. at 246-47.
121 Id. at 255.
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preference for one label or the other. Second, where Congress has
indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired
further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose
or effect as to negate that intention. In regard to this latter inquiry, we
have noted that "only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the
unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground." 122
The Court referred to an earlier case to help interpret whether a
statute is so punitive as to negate a civil intention on the part of
Congress. 123 In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, the U.S. attempted to
divest Mendoza-Martinez of his citizenship after he had moved to
Mexico to avoid military service. The Court, in deciding that Men-
doza-Martinez had been deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights, listed seven factors to consider when deciding whether a stat-
ute is criminal:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry. 124
Federal courts have applied the Ward test and the Mendoza-Mar-
tinez factors when declaring various forfeitures to be civil in nature.
In United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,125 for example, the
Court authorized a seizure of firearms that were purchased and pos-
sessed with the intent of selling them without a license. After re-
viewing legislative statements and examining the nature of the
forfeiture provisions, the Court concluded that the intention of
Congress was to adopt a civil provision. 126
The next step was to inquire whether the scheme was so puni-
tive as to negate Congress' intention. In a cursory statement, the
Court declared that only the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor was rele-
vant - that the behavior described in the civil forfeiture statute was
already a crime.127 The Court then dismissed that factor, emphasiz-
122 Id at 248-49 (citations omitted).
123 The Ward Court noted, "In making this determination, both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals found it useful to refer to the seven considerations listed in Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez. This list of considerations, while certainly neither exhaustive nor
dispositive, has proved helpful in our own consideration of similar questions." Ward,
448 U.S. at 249.
124 Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
125 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
126 Id. at 356.




ing Congress' ability to devise simultaneous civil and criminal sanc-
tions for conduct it proscribes. 128
VI. APPLYING THE WARD TEST AND THE MENDOZA-MARTINEZ
FACTORS TO § 881
A. DISTINGUISHING TYPES OF CONTRABAND
The procedural protections granted by the Act depend upon
the type of property being forfeited. Some property is illegal to
possess under any circumstances. Certain drugs, for example, are
considered so dangerous that the U.S. prohibits their possession,
manufacture and distribution. Section 881(a)(1) is aimed at such
drugs, which are considered contraband per se. 129 Since nobody can
legally own such property130 and since remedial purposes are di-
rectly advanced when illicit substances are taken off the streets,' 3 '
forfeiture statutes aimed at per se contraband should be subjected to
limited scrutiny.
A second class of forfeitable property is the proceeds from any
illegal transaction, including all assets acquired with drug money.13 2
Forfeitures of proceeds ensure that criminals are not allowed to re-
tain the fruits of their crimes.' 3 3 Section 881 authorizes the forfei-
ture of proceeds of drug transactions, assets traceable to such
proceeds and assets used to facilitate illegal activities or intended as
128 Id. The Court repeated its statement in Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399
(1938): "Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the
same act or omission."
129 See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 691, 699 (1965); United
States v. Farrell, 606 F.2d 1341, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Clark, supra note 65, at 478;
Henry C. Darmstadter & LeslieJ. Mackoff, Some Constitutional and Practical Considerations of
Civil Foofeitures Under 21 U.S.C. § 881, 9 WHrrrER L. REV. 27, 30 (1987); Petrov, supra
note 60, at 832. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
130 See Clark, supra note 65, at 478 ("It may be argued, rather conceptually, that forfei-
ture of such items [contraband per se] does not punish or deter because they are never
legally owned and, consequently, no deprivation of a legal property interest is involved
in their forfeiture."); Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 129, at 30; Petrov, supra note
60, at 832; Parcels, supra note 62, at 437 ("Almost all disputed forfeitures involve articles
that are not intrinsically illegal but derive contraband status from use in criminal
activities.").
131 Removing illegal drugs from our society is a remedial goal, aimed at preventing
dangerous abuses rather than punishing any individual. Laws requiring purity in food
and limiting gun ownership also achieve remedial ends with civil mechanisms. Removal
of inherently harmful substances from the population is a means of preventing injury
rather than punishing individuals after the damage has occurred. See United States v. 38
Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1990); Clark, supra note 65, at
479.
132 See Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 129, at 30; Fried, supra note 62, at 375.
133 See Darmstadter & Mackoff, supra note 129, at 31; Fried, supra note 62, at 411.
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payment for illegal narcotics. 3 4 Forfeitures of proceeds of illegal
activities presents a difficult problem in the classification of govern-
ment sanctions due to the converging goals of restitution and
retribution. ' 3 5
Finally, a third category of forfeitable property includes so-
called "tools" or "instrumentalities" of crime. When some other-
wise legally held property is employed to facilitate a crime, that item
becomes derivative contraband. 3 6 Section 881, for example, autho-
rizes the forfeiture of chemicals, laboratory equipment, boxes, bot-
tles, airplanes, automobiles, land and buildings used to
manufacture, store, distribute, sell or possess illegal drugs. 3 7
When the government forfeits derivative contraband, it effectuates
criminal punishment and should be held to the highest standards of
proof.
B. APPLYING THE FIRST PRONG OF THE WARD TEST
Several courts have applied the Ward test and the Mendoza-Mar-
tinez factors to § 881 forfeitures.' 3 8 According to these courts, Con-
134 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
135 It could be argued that, since such forfeitures further the essentially civil goal of
restitution, they should be classified as civil penalties. This argument, however, rests on
a misunderstanding of restitution. Restitution is the return of ill-gotten gains to the
victim of the illegal activity. For example, the proceeds of a bank robbery may be re-
turned to the bank. Section 881, however, provides no mechanism for the return of
assets to those victimized by the prohibited activity. It provides merely that such assets
shall become the property of the government. When viewed in such a light, forfeitures
of proceeds under § 881 are no more restitutionary than any other fines or penalties.
Such forfeitures promote purely retributive goals, long considered the exclusive domain
of the criminal law. See Fried, supra note 62, at 399 (noting that "[t]he forfeiture of
proceeds is precisely retributive, effectuating the principle that the criminal shall not
profit by his crime.").
Two aspects of § 881 highlight its essentially retributive nature. First, the statute's
innocent owner defense provides in essence that the assets of claimants who can show
themselves morally innocent shall not be forfeited. See supra notes 55-66 and accompa-
nying text. Second, the statute provides for forfeiture of assets purchased only partially
with the proceeds of prohibited activity. See § 881(a)(b). The government need not re-
imburse a claimant for any portion of the forfeited property even if the claimant is able
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that some of the funds used to purchase an
asset were the result of legal employment. United States v. 15603 85th Ave., 933 F.2d
976, 981-82 (11th Cir. 1991). But see United States v. Pole No. 3172 Hopkinton, 852
F.2d 636, 639-40 (1st Cir. 1988). Neither of these provisions can be explained using a
restitutionary theory.
136 See supra note 129.
137 See supra notes 8-9, 12 and accompanying text.
138 See, e.g., United States v. Price,. 914 F.2d 1507, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United
States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 400-01 (3d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. $2,500 in
United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. 16 Clinton
St., 730 F.Supp 1265, 1270-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Some cases have not explicitly applied
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gress intended to create a civil or remedial forfeiture procedure.
The purpose of § 881 was not to punish drug dealers, these courts
reason, but to take away their means of distributing narcotics. 139
Additionally, forfeitures reimburse society for the costs of the illegal
conduct and the enforcement of criminal laws. 140
These courts reason that the existence of a separate provision
permitting criminal forfeitures evidences Congress' intent to create
a civil remedy. 141 Additionally, § 881 explicitly states that "property
is subject to civil forfeiture under this title." 142 Examining the statu-
tory scheme as a whole, one court explained:
[C]ongress indicated both 'expressly [and] impliedly a preference for'
the civil label. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970 makes a clear distinction between criminal 'Offenses
and Penalties,' which are set forth in Part D of the Act, and 'Adminis-
trative and Enforcement Provisions,' including forfeiture, which are
set forth in Part E. 14 3
Finally, the procedures for forfeiture under § 881 are civil in nature,
providing additional support for the notion that Congress envi-
sioned a civil mechanism.144 For these reasons, courts applying the
Ward test have concluded that Congress intended § 881 to be civil in
nature.
A look at Congress' motivations and expectations, however,
shows undeniably the punitive nature of § 881. The legislative his-
tory of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
indicates that Congress intended forfeiture of derivative contraband
to be criminal in nature. Members of Congress clearly stated their
intentions that the civil forfeiture provisions impose punishment on
violators.
the Ward test, but have instead ignored the intent inquiry and jumped to the second
prong of Ward, asking whether a statute is punitive in purpose or effect. See, e.g., United
States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1989).
139 See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
140 See infra notes 236-37, 254-55 and accompanying text.
141 See Price, 914 F.2d at 1512; United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532,
543 (5th Cir. 1987) (referring to 21 U.S.C. § 853).
142 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(4) (emphasis added).
143 United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 13-14 (2d Cir.
1982) (citations omitted). See also United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898
F.2d 396, 400 (3d Cir. 1990); D.K.G. Appaloosas, 829 F.2d at 543.
144 See 21 U.S.C. 881(b), (d); Price, 914 F.2d at 1512; One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898
F.2d at 400; United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir. 1989) ("The statute
expressly provides for the use of the rules of civil admiralty, as well as the use of the civil
procedures of the customs laws. As the Supreme Court has noted, Congressional intent
is 'clearly demonstrated by the procedural mechanisms it established for enforcing for-
feitures under the statute.' ") (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms,
465 U.S. 354, 363 (1984)) (citations omitted); D.K.G. Appaloosas, 829 F.2d at 543.
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For example, a joint explanatory statement described the for-
feitures: "Due to the penal nature of forfeiture statutes, it is the
intent of these provisions that the property would be forfeited only
if there is a substantial connection between the property and the
underlying criminal activity which the statute seeks to prevent."' 145
Similarly, Senator Sam Nunn, who sponsored the amendments pro-
viding for forfeitures of proceeds of illegal activities, stated, "[t]he
punitive and deterrent purposes of the Controlled Substances Act
would have greater impact on drug trafficking."' 146 Finally, a con-
gressional panel reviewing the purposes of the 1984 amendments
noted:
Today, few in the Congress or the law enforcement community fail to
recognize that the traditional sanctions of fine and imprisonment are
inadequate to deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dan-
gerous drugs which, with its inevitable attendant violence, is plaguing
the country .... Forfeiture is the mechanism through which such an
attack may be made. 147
Analyzing this record, several courts have recognized the puni-
tive motivations of the Congress. 148 The D.C. Circuit, for example,
stated that "[§ 881] deters drug trafficking by seizing assets and sub-
jecting them to forfeiture." 14 Similarly, the Second Circuit has
taken note of "[C]ongressional concern with rising drug trafficking
in this country and its conviction that those who profit and thrive
upon the misery of drug addicts should be punished financially by
forfeiture."' 150 The Eleventh Circuit has observed, "The language
of § 881(a) (7) reflects two interrelated aims of Congress: to punish
criminals while ensuring that innocent persons are not penalized for
their unwitting association with wrongdoers." '' 1 The Seventh Cir-
cuit observed that "[t]he loss of one's home for the sale of a small
145 Act of October 13, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, 8511, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.)
9518, 9522.
146 124 CONG. REC. 23, 055 (1978).
147 Act of October 11, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3182,
3374 (emphasis added).
148 See, e.g., United States v. United States Currency, 626 F.2d 11, 18 (6th Cir. 1980)
(Merritt, J., concurring); United States v. Leasehold Interest in 121 Nostrand Ave., 760
F. Supp. 1015, 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
149 United States v. Price, 914 F.2d 1507, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The D.C. Circuit
unwittingly described the deterrent function of § 881 as a remedial purpose, thus justify-
ing the civil characterization of the forfeiture provisions. Id. at 1512-13.
150 United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir.
1977) (referring to § 781 within an opinion regarding a § 881 forfeiture).
151 United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1990).
More recently, the Eleventh Circuit has described a violation of § 881 as "criminal con-
duct" on the part of a claimant who knew of but did not participate in illegal activities on




amount of cocaine is undoubtedly a harsh penalty. But Congress
has intended this harsh punishment for those who sell illegal
drugs." 152 Finally, one court concluded that "[t]he Act brought
real property within the scope of civil as well as criminal forfeiture
.... No distinction between the purposes of civil and criminal for-
feiture is apparent from the legislative history, which describes both
as weapons of deterrence."15 3
Perhaps most persuasive of all, the Supreme Court has implic-
itly recognized § 881's criminal nature. In Calero-Toledo, the Court
disposed of a Takings Clause claim by arguing that the forfeiture
mechanism was criminal in nature.
Plainly, the Puerto Rican forfeiture statutes further the punitive and de-
terrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against con-
stitutional challenge, the applications of other forfeiture statutes to the
property of innocents. Forfeitures of conveyances that have been used
- and may be used again - in violation of the narcotics laws fosters
the purpose served by the underlying criminal statutes, both by preventing fur-
ther illicit use of the conveyance and by imposing an economic pen-
alty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable. 154
In sum, when not faced with a constitutional challenge, courts
have felt free to disregard the civil label. Congress' stated intention
was to fashion a forfeiture statute to deter criminal activity. Under
Ward, § 881 should be declared criminal and all procedural protec-
tions required in criminal cases should be guaranteed in forfeiture
prosecutions aimed at derivative contraband.
C. THE SECOND PRONG OF WARD AND THE MENDOZA-MARTINEZ
FACTORS
The second prong of the Ward test asks whether the statute is so
punitive in purpose or effect that the forfeiture cannot be treated as
civil. Emphasizing the stringency of the Ward test, the Court has
explained: " 'Only the clearest proof' that the purpose and effect of
the forfeiture are punitive will suffice to override Congress' manifest
preference for a civil sanction." 1 55 Because the standard is so de-
manding, courts have been hesitant to classify § 881 forfeitures as
152 United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 494-95 (7th Cir. 1990).
153 United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
154 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686-87 (1974) (em-
phasis added). The Court was referring to a different statutory scheme, but a footnote
explained that "[b]ut for unimportant differences, [the Puerto Rican statute] is modelled
after 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)." Id. at 686 n.25. The Court then went on to quote § 881(a)(4),
which provides for the forfeiture of conveyances used to transport illicit substances.
155 United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 365 (1984). See
also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249 (1980).
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criminal. The decisions are characterized by the use of a vague bal-
ancing test. Typical is a comment by the Third Circuit: "Although
reasonable minds might disagree, we conclude that the purpose or
effect of the statute does not belie a civil sanction."' 56 Some reme-
dial connection usually can be made between forfeitures and the
dangers of the drug trade. As long as this nexus is conceivable,
courts are unwilling to re-characterize the statute.
The fact that the legislature labeled a statute civil rather than
criminal should not relieve courts of their responsibility to review
the constitutionality of that statute. In order to determine if crimi-
nal protections are required, courts ask whether the legislature se-
lected civil labels and procedures. The question of whether the
sanctions are criminal in substance, however, remains unanswered
by inquiries concerning labels. This is all the more important in a
situation where the legislative history indicates an intent to deter
criminal conduct.' 57 Regardless of how much deference is given to
Congress, it is difficult to conclude that § 881 is anything but crimi-
nal in nature.
1. A Tailored, Remedial Justification as a Predicate for Attaching the
Civil Label
Application of the Mendoza-Martinez factors reveals that § 881
has a punitive purpose or effect.' 58 Taking derivative contraband
undoubtedly imposes an "affirmative disability or restraint" on the
owner, satisfying the first factor. The Mendoza-Martinez Court did
not define these terms, never applying the factors.' 59 Black's Law
Dictionary defines "disability" as: "The want of legal capability to
perform an act. Term is generally used to indicate an incapacity for
the full enjoyment of ordinary legal rights; thus persons under age,
insane persons and convicts are said to be under legal disability." 160
When the government takes a person's home or automobile without
compensation, the government has imposed on that person.
156 United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396, 398 (3d Cir. 1990).
See also United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989); Bramble v.
Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 972 (10th Cir. 1974) ("Unfortunately, an analysis of the cases
both antedating and succeeding Helvering convinces us that the civil-criminal distinction,
whether characterized as remedial-penal or otherwise, is indeed an elusive one.").
157 See supra notes 146, 179 and accompanying text.
158 The two inquiries appear to have been merged by the Mendoza-Martinez factors.
The Court has even unwittingly eliminated the disjunctive on one occasion, requiring
proof of both punitive purpose and effect before declaring a statute criminal in nature.
One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365.
159 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).
160 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 461.
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As contraband per se is illegal to posses, the claimant cannot le-
gally own the items subject to forfeiture. Theoretically, the'govern-
ment does not impose a disability if no legal property interest
existed in the first place.' 61 The same argument can be made of
assets derived from the proceeds of illegal transactions. If a crimi-
nal gained the asset as the result of illegal conduct, he does not
rightly own it.162 Likewise, someone who owns derivative contra-
band arguably gives up ownership of that property by permitting its
use in a criminal act.
The lack of "ownership" in the case of derivative contra-
band, 163 however, is merely semantic. If property interests are
divested upon the commission of a particular act, the government
can assert that the possessor voluntarily committed the act and gave
up any interest in the property. No forfeiture involves an affirmative
disability or restraint when ownership is defined in this manner.
The government could routinely avoid the attachment of criminal
protections by defining away the injury. Indeed, any government
forfeiture imposes a disability for the purposes of the Mendoza-Marti-
nez factors. As Professor Clark has written, "Any burden can be
viewed as an affirmative disability or restraint . . . .The question
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint is
better simplified to whether there is a sanction at all - or in H.L.A.
Hart's terms, whether there is 'pain or some consequence normally
considered unpleasant.' "164
The second Mendoza-Martinez factor asks whether the sanction
has historically been regarded as punishment. The Court's mud-
dled handling of forfeiture statutes in the past has resulted in the
"quasi-criminal" label, whereby forfeitures are considered criminal
for some purposes and not for others. 165 The historical inquiry re-
quired by Mendoza-Martinez asks a more fundamental question than
the traditional in personam/in rem distinction. The Mendoza-Martinez
Court was concerned with special disabilities that do not fit neatly
into the criminal justice system. Although imprisonment and fines
are routinely used as punishment, for example, sanctions such as
revocation of an educational institution's accreditation or an indi-
vidual's business license might deserve different treatment based on
their past applications. In Mendoza-Martinez, the divestiture of citi-
zenship was not so obviously viewed as punishment and demanded
161 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
163 The same argument probably applies in the case of proceeds of illegal activities.
164 Clark, supra note 65, at 455.




Courts should inquire into whether a given sanction has histori-
cally been employed as a means of criminal punishment. Prior use
of special impositions might shed light on their current application.
In the case of § 881, forfeitures have traditionally been used to pun-
ish and thus satisfy the second factor.1 67 Permanent seizures of
property such as automobiles and homes are akin to fines and do
not deserve special categorization, even if such sanctions serve alter-
native purposes on some occasions.
Even if a court were to examine the in personam/in rem distinc-
tion while applying the second Mendoza-Martinez factor, civil forfeit-
ures carry obvious punitive effect. The attachment of the "quasi-
criminal" label indicates that forfeitures have been viewed as impos-
ing more bite than a civil judgment.168 Modern constitutional juris-
prudence should evaluate their true nature regardless of their
historical label. 169
The third factor questions the degree of personal responsibility
necessary for a forfeiture. 70 Courts finding § 881 to be civil in na-
ture have declared that the degree of culpability is irrelevant in
§ 881 forfeiture decisions.' 71 This description ignores several pro-
visions in the statute. For example, the "innocent owner" defense
can make the claimant's mental state decisive in any § 881 action. 172
Additionally, the forfeiture provisions also inquire into whether the
property was "intended to be used" to violate or facilitate a viola-
tion of drug laws.' 73
Furthermore, simply eliminating the mens rea element from a
criminal law does not insulate the statute from constitutional chal-
lenges. Even if forfeiture provisions are viewed as strict liability
schemes, owners are personally responsible if they permit their
property to facilitate wrongful conduct. 74 In fact, many strict liabil-
ity statutes are explicitly regarded as criminal despite their lack of a
166 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 n.23 (1963).
167 See supra notes 6, 103 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
170 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY succinctly defines "scienter" as "knowingly." BLAcK's
LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 1345. See also infra note 176.
171 United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1982).
172 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
173 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (6), (7); United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990
(4th Cir. 1990); United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58 Foot Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884,
887-88 (1 1th Cir. 1989) ("It is the state of mind of the criminal with respect to the
property sought to be forfeited which is determinative, not whether the property is actu-
ally used to execute the criminal intentions.").




Finally, courts should note that the Mendoza-Martinez Court
brought in the issue of culpability because of the notion that a crimi-
nal conviction attaches with it a degree of moral responsibility. 176
Although a § 881 forfeiture action might not require determination
of an individual's responsibility, some social blame attaches none-
theless. 177 Therefore, the reasons for applying the scienter require-
ment are satisfied.
The fourth factor, which asks whether the statute promotes the
traditionally punitive goals of retribution and deterrence, provides
the best argument for declaring § 881 criminal in nature. Section
881 was intended to impose punishment on drug dealers. 178 Fur-
ther, the existence of an innocent owner defense provides strong
evidence that the goal of the statute is to impose punishment only
on those shown to be morally deserving of it.17 9
Additionally, § 881 has the effect of deterring drug-related ac-
tivity.' 8 0 By imposing costs on those who have acted or failed to act
in a particular manner, 18 1 it provides clear incentives. The legisla-
tive history of the section reveals that Congress was well aware of
175 See Charney, supra note 113, at 495.
176 See Clark, supra note 65, at 456-57 (The third and fifth factors combine to form the
concept of deterrence, which is based "on the notion of purposive offense or culpabil-
ity."). If conduct occurs unknowingly, the actor cannot be said to have purposely cho-
sen a particular path and is not morally blameworthy.
177 See supra notes 61-62, 115-16 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
179 Id.
180 Some observers argue that forfeitures of proceeds of illegal activities do not deter
potential criminals because the forfeiture only returns what was not originally owned.
The criminal has not been made any worse off than before the criminal conduct and
therefore will not be deterred. See Clark, supra note 65, at 478; Fried, supra note 62, at
371-72; Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1201-02 (1985).
In reality, § 881 forfeitures of proceeds of criminal activities probably do result in
deterrence. First, the argument against deterrence ignores the value of time and effort.
When people devote their professional efforts to an activity and buy assets with their
profits, they feel as though they have earned those assets. The threat that the govern-
ment might come along and take away all your earnings if you choose a career as a drug
dealer is a deterrent. Drug dealers always face the threat that their homes, cars and
financial security will be swept away in an instant.
The non-deterrence argument is similar to the game played in defining what prop-
erty actually belongs to an individual. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. If
someone did not truly deserve a house in the first place, the argument goes, then taking
away the home is not a deterrent. What a person is legally entitled to, however, is not
always the same as what a person believes is deserved. If taken to its logical conse-
quence, the non-deterrence argument would obliterate the meaning of the fourth Men-
doza-Martinez factor just as it would the meaning of the first.
181 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 450 (defining deter).
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this deterrent effect.18 2
The fifth factor, which asks whether the behavior to which the
statute applies is already a crime, strengthens the case for treating
§ 881 as a criminal statute. Section 881 applies to activities that are
subject to criminal sanctions. Indeed, that § 881 forfeitures occur
only in conjunction with criminal conduct belies any congressional
indications that the statute is civil in nature.'83
The case for interpreting § 881 as a civil statute comes down to
the sixth and seventh Mendoza-Martinez factors. If an alternative or
non-punitive purpose exists for § 881 forfeitures and if such forfeit-
ures are not excessive in relation to the alternative purpose, then
the punitive impact of § 881 is merely incidental to the achievement
of remedial or regulatory goals.
The Supreme Court explained the application of these factors
in other contexts. In holding that the detention of arrestees could
182 In sponsoring the 1978 amendment to § 881, Senator Sam Nunn argued in favor
of § 881(a)(6) as a deterrent:
The criminal justice system can only be effective if there is a meaningful deterrent.
It is important that the offender be aware of the risk he is running. In today's nar-
cotic traffic the profits to be made are astronomical .... [D]eterrence is minimized
because it is difficult to attack an individual's sources of finance for narcotics traf-
ficking. We cannot forget that profit, astronomical profit, is the base motivation of
drug traffickers. The amendment I propose here today is intended to enhance the
efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs in the United States by striking out against
the profits from illegal drug trafficking.
124 CONG. REC. 23,055 (1978). See also supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
183 The Court has adverted to the significance of the coextensive nature of conduct
sanctioned by civil provisions and conduct sanctioned by expressly criminal penalties:
[C~ongress in fact drafted [the statute providing for civil forfeiture of firearms] to
cover a broader range of conduct than is proscribed by the criminal provisions ....
Because the sanction embodied in [the statute providing for civil forfeiture of fire-
arms] is not limited to criminal misconduct, the forfeiture remedy cannot be said to
be coextensive with the criminal penalty. What overlap there is between the two
sanctions is not sufficient to persuade us that the forfeiture proceeding may not
legitimately be viewed as civil in nature.
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984) (applying the
fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor).
The Fifth Circuit flips this argument on its head by arguing that § 881 is broader in
coverage than the parallel criminal forfeiture statute (§ 853) because of the different
burdens of proof. As § 853 requires a criminal conviction based on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, forfeitures that would be impossible under the criminal provisions
could occur under § 881. See supra note 6. Thus, the court reasons, the civil provisions
go beyond the criminal ones. See United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d
532, 544 (5th Cir. 1987).
The point of the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor is not that the lower burden of proof
makes civil statutes broader than criminal statutes. Rather than pursuing such a circular
rationale, the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor is directed at the conduct proscribed. Under
a probable cause standard, the government might have an easier time proving that par-
ticular acts occurred. The same conduct that forms the predicate for a § 881 action,
however, can do so for a criminal prosecution. All predicate acts identified in § 881 are
also subject to expressly criminal sanctions.
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fail to pass muster under the test, the Court explained that "[i]n the
absence of a showing of intent to punish, a court must look to see if
a particular restriction or condition, which may on its face appear to
be punishment, is instead but an incident of a legitimate nonpuni-
tive governmental objective. Retribution and deterrence are not le-
gitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives.' 4  Similarly, in
analyzing a pretrial commitment procedure to determine the com-
petency of defendants, the Court cautioned that, "[a]t the least, due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed." 18 5 Thus, § 881 must not burden property owners any
more than is reasonably necessary to achieve its regulatory ends.
Reviewing an excessive civil penalty that the government
claimed served the purpose of compensation for damages, the
Supreme Court applied these factors in an even more stringent
manner:
We have recognized in other contexts that punishment serves the twin
aims of retribution and deterrence. Furthermore, "[r]etribution and
deterrence are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives."
From these premises, it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly
be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can be explained
only as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punish-
ment, as we have come to understand the term. 186
This language apparently demands a criminal label if any punitive
goals are served. 187
The civil forfeiture provisions aimed at derivative contraband
184 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979).
185 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
186 United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (citations omitted, emphasis
added). The Halper Court cited the sixth and seventh Mendoza-Martinez factors to sup-
port such a stark proposition. Id.
187 Although the language of Halper appears absolute, the Court probably should not
be taken literally. First, decades of precedent indicate that all that is necessary is a rea-
sonable relation, not a perfect one. See supra notes 126, 187-88 and accompanying text.
Second, such an extreme interpretation would effectively eliminate the possibility of a
"civil" forfeiture. No forfeiture can be described as solely remedial, as some punitive
impact is inevitable when the state takes away property. As one court commented:
The presence of both punitive and remedial goals does not of itself convert a civil
statute into a criminal measure, or vice versa. To some degree all civil forfeiture
acts as a deterrent to owners of property, if only to encourage them to take all
reasonable care that their property is not put to illegal use. Indeed, the application
of ordinary tort law usually has a deterrent effect. The material inquiry is not
whether civil forfeiture is punitive in purpose and effect. It usually is. The question
is whether the forfeiture serves some alternative purpose as well, and whether the
penalty inflicted is excessive in relation to that alternative purpose.
United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (cita-
tions omitted). See also United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989)
("[t]he punitive aspects of any forfeiture are self-evident...").
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do not meet- these requirements. Section 881 is so broad in both
scope of forfeiture and impact on claimant that it cannot possibly be
described as civil after an honest application the sixth and seventh
Mendoza-Martinez factors. If Congress had intended to adopt a crimi-
nal measure, aimed not merely at reducing the incidence of drug
use through remedial measures but instead at punishing drug deal-
ers and users, it could hardly have come up with a more punitive
and extensive forfeiture scheme.
2. RemedialJustifications and Instrumentalities of Crime
Section 881 authorizes the forfeiture of property used to facili-
tate the possession, manufacture or distribution of illegal drugs. 188
Currency, automobiles, airplanes, ships, buildings, land and even
leaseholds have been forfeited under the statute.18 9 These forfeit-
ures, according to many courts, prevent future drug transactions
and their attendant harms by removing the tools of the drug
trade. 190 One court spelled out, "The intent of the forfeiture provi-
sion of [§ 881] is to deprive criminals of the tools by which they
conduct their illegal activities." 19 1 If a ship regularly carries cocaine
to the U.S., for example, forfeiture of the ship will make it more
difficult for the drugs to arrive. Forfeiture might cause hardship to
its owner, but such hardship is incidental to the government's actual
purpose. The aim is not to punish, but to prevent potential drug
users and other persons from being hurt.
Derivative contraband, however, is not an instrument of crime.
A particular automobile or airplane does not make it easier to de-
188 See supra notes 8-9, 12 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
190 E.g., United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543-44 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he
remedial, non-punitive purposes of [§ 881] are extremely strong: 'These remedial pur-
poses include ... stripping the drug trade of its instrumentalities.' ") (quoting United
States v. 2639 Meeting House Rd., 633 F. Supp. 979, 993-94 (E.D. Pa. 1986)); United
States v. 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. $2,500 in
United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Forfeiture of drugs, vehi-
cles and money used in drug trafficking has many apparent remedial, non-punitive pur-
poses. These include impeding the success of the criminal enterprise by eliminating its
resources and instrumentalities .... [Section 881] was clearly aimed at the instrumental-
ities of the drug trade with the clear intent of preventing their continued use."); United
States v. Eighty-Eight Designated Accounts, 740 F. Supp. 842, 848 (S.D. Fla. 1990);
United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. at 1295, 1297 (W.D. Ark. 1990) ("Sec-
tion 881(a)(7) is designed to strip the drug trade of the instrumentalities of crime, in-
cluding real estate used to facilitate drug transactions."); United States v. One 1976
Buick Skylark, 453 F. Supp. 639, 643 (D. Colo. 1978) ("The primary purpose of[§ 881]
is to cripple illegal drug trafficking and narcotics activity by depriving narcotics peddlers
of the operating tools of their trade.").
191 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d at 217.
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liver drugs, a particular building does not make it easier to sell or
store drugs and a particular piece of land does not make it easier to
grow or manufacture drugs. Cocaine physically takes up space
somewhere. Being in one apartment makes the drug no more dan-
gerous or useful than if it were in a coat pocket, on a boat or in
another apartment. Evidence that a truck transports marijuana does
not prove that a different truck or an automobile could not deliver
the controlled substance. Forfeiture of derivative contraband,
therefore, does not preclude any illegal activity.
Only if the derivative contraband is indispensable to the com-
mission of crime could its forfeiture possibly be remedial. In order
for a forfeiture to reduce future harmful activity, the property must
be necessary for the wrongful conduct and it must be irreplaceable
(or at least difficult to replace).' 92 As alternatives will almost always
exist, § 881 forfeitures of derivative contraband cannot be justified
as remedial based on an "instrumentalities of crime" rationale.
In United States v. One 1972 Datsun,' 93 a drug dealer used an au-
tomobile to lead an undercover agent to the scene of an illegal sale.
The court found that the vehicle was not a usual element in an
ongoing criminal enterprise and that forfeiture of the particular au-
tomobile would therefore not prevent future illegal sales of narcot-
ics. The court concluded that forfeiture of the car would exceed the
remedial purposes of § 881:
Unlike the seizure ofper se contraband, "the possession of which, with-
out more, constitutes a crime," and the seizure of which directly pro-
motes the remedial goals of a forfeiture scheme, seizure of derivative
contraband may or may not be remedial, depending on the nature and
substantiality of its association with the underlying illegal activity.
Therefore, it is important to require that derivative contraband be
substantially and instrumentally connected with illegal behavior before
it is subject to forfeiture. Otherwise, the Government, by electing to
proceed against suspects via the forfeiture route, could deprive citi-
zens of the constitutionally-mandated safeguards which surround the
criminal process. 194
192 See Clark, supra note 65, at 479.
193 In re One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974).
194 Id. at 1206. Unfortunately, the court did not take this principle to its logical end.
Although recognizing that an automobile that transports a wrongdoer to the scene of a
crime should not be forfeited without affording criminal protections to its owner, the
court explained in dicta that derivative contraband need not be uniquely suited to illegal
activities and need not be difficult to replace to fall under § 881. Id. at 1202-03. Rather,
the court's concern was the property's level of involvement in a particular illegal transac-
tion. The court elaborated:
It is clear that any intentional transportation or concealment of contraband in a
conveyance, no matter how small the amount, will subject the conveyance to forfei-
ture. In addition, use of a vehicle as a place for conducting negotiations for or
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Arguably, the government could achieve its regulatory pur-
poses by bankrupting a claimant. Section 881 allows forfeiture of
property intended to be used to facilitate a drug crime. 195 If the
government could establish probable cause to believe that a claim-
ant would merely purchase a new piece of property with which to
commit offenses, the Act could be interpreted as allowing forfeiture
of most or even all of a claimant's assets. 196
Constitutionally, however, complete bankruptcy would be ex-
cessive in relation to the remedial purpose.197 If most of a person's
property has no tie to illegal activities, forfeiture of all of that per-
son's assets would go far beyond the specific regulatory purpose of
removing tools of crime from the hands of wrongdoers. The total
economic incapacitation of an alleged wrongdoer should be treated
the same as incapacitation through imprisonment, which would
clearly be excessive in relation to almost any civil purpose. When
wrongdoers are put in jail, a remedial purpose is served to the ex-
tent that they will be unable to commit more crimes. Despite serv-
ing the function of incapacitation, the punitive nature of a
prolonged imprisonment would be excessive in relation to the alter-
native purpose. 198 The same rationale applies to economic incapac-
itation. As one court observed:
[T]here is nothing inherently unlawful about possessing a condomin-
ium. A forfeiture in the present case may incapacitate the owner who
permits the illegal use, but hardly rids society of a noxious instrumen-
transacting any portion of a sale is sufficient to subject the vehicle to forfeiture. Use
as a look-out or decoy vehicle in a convoy will also render the vehicle subject to
forfeiture.
Id. at 1202 (citation omitted).
See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 691, 699 (1965)
("[T]he return of the automobile to the owner would not subject him to any possible
criminal penalties for possession or frustrate any public policy concerning automobiles,
as automobiles."); Howard v. United States, 423 F.2d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1970) (In
the context of a § 781 forfeiture, "[t]he seized car was merely the means of locomotion
by which the person suspected of participating in illegal drug trafficking reached the site
of that activity. The ease or the difficulty of transporting the marihuana in the Chevrolet
was not affected by the manner in which [the claimant] reached the load car."); United
States v. Leasehold Interest in 850 S. Maple, 743 F. Supp. 505, 511 (E.D. Mich. 1990);
Clark, supra note 65, at 480; Fried, supra note 62, at 384.
195 See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
196 See In re Kingsley, 802 F.2d 571 (1st Cir. 1986) (government seized all of a per-
son's assets, including home and its contents, based on an attempted proceeds
forfeiture).
197 Several statutory arguments are also possible. Courts might interpret § 88 l's "in-
tended use" provisions as requiring specificity in the identification of forfeitable assets.
See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a). The government would have to establish probable cause to be-
lieve that a particular item or investment was going to be exchanged for a new
instrumentality.
198 See infra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.
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tality. Incapacitation could also be accomplished by criminal meas-
ures, avowedly punitive, such as imposing heavy fines or constraining
the person's liberty by imprisonment. It was just such a practice of
economically disabling those whom the Stuarts considered dangerous
that led to the incorporation in the English constitution of the precur-
sor to the excessive fines clause of our Eight Amendment.' 99
Forfeiture of all of a person's assets would be excessively punitive if
accomplished through a civil procedure designed to attack narcotics
trafficking. Forfeitures of assets that are legal to possess can rarely
if ever be described as remedial in nature.
Unfortunately, most courts have not recognized this principle.
Section 881 is routinely applied to property with only tenuous con-
nections to an illegal transaction and that is unnecessary for contin-
ued law violations. In United States v. 916 Douglas Avenue, 200 for
example, a homeowner received a telephone call at his house and
negotiated a cocaine sale during the subsequent conversation. The
actual exchange of drugs for money took place at a different loca-
tion. No other connection between the home and the drug transac-
tion was alleged. The court found that a sufficient nexus existed for
forfeiture. 201 The court never explained how taking the home
would prevent future drug sales. These transactions could be nego-
tiated over a pay phone, over a mobile cellular phone, in writing or
in person.
In another case, police found four cigarette butts containing
marijuana in an automobile.20 2 No other link to drugs was alleged.
No witnesses connected the car owner to the marijuana or estab-
lished how forfeiting the automobile would prevent future drug use.
Nevertheless, a forfeiture was approved.203
In another case, the court approved the forfeiture of an auto-
mobile because the vehicle happened to be in front of two people
conducting a drug transaction. Whether the car transported any
money, weapons, drugs or persons involved in the exchange was
irrelevant:
[T]he test [for facilitation] was "whether there was a reasonable
199 United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
(citations omitted).
200 United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1990).
201 Id. at 494. The court explained, "When Mueller called Born at his home tele-
phone number on April 15, 1986, Born negotiated the price and quantity of cocaine to
be sold the next day. When Meuller called Born's number again on April 16, he was
able to arrange the entire transaction with Mazzanti .... Given this history, we are
satisfied that the district court properly found that the nexus between Born's house and
the drug offense was not incidental or fortuitous." Id.
202 United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196 (6th Cir. 1978).
203 Id. at 198.
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ground for belief that the use of the automobile made the sale less
difficult and allowed it to remain more or less free from obstruction or
hindrance." The facts in this case satisfy the test. The presence of the
automobile with its hood up provided a convenient cover whereas the
two men alone in an alley might have appeared suspicious. Under
these circumstances, a reasonable belief is warranted that the automo-
bile facilitated the sale.20 4
Obviously, the car hood was not necessary for the transaction. Fu-
ture sales can take place in a private apartment, behind a trash
dumpster or even under the cover of a cardboard box.
These cases are not isolated examples. Section 881 is routinely
applied without any inquiry into remedial impact on future activi-
ties. 20 5 Some courts have tried to correct for the incongruity be-
204 United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir.
1981) (citations omitted).
205 In United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado, 548 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1977), a car
owner drove a friend to an apartment where the friend attempted to negotiate a drug
sale. Although no cash or drugs were ever transported in the car and although the drug
sale never occurred, the automobile was forfeited. The court concluded, "If the pur-
pose of [§ 881] is, as Congress indicated, to reduce the profits of those who practice this
nefarious profession, we are loath to make the forfeiture depend upon the accident of
whether the dope is physically present in the vehicle .... The conveyance of Santiago
and Montanez in the Cadillac to and from theJune 7 meeting did facilitate the sale of the
drug." Id. at 426-27.
Similarly, in United States v. One 1977 Cadillac Coupe DeVille, 644 F.2d 500 (5th
Cir. 1981), an automobile was used to transport two people to the site of a cocaine sale.
Neither contraband nor cash for the purchase were transported in the vehicle. Never-
theless, the court approved the forfeiture: "The use of the Cadillac in transporting [the
claimant] to the site facilitated the transaction by enabling her to consummate the sale at
the prearranged time and place. We conclude such use of the vehicle to transport the
dealer to the scene forms a sufficient nexus between the vehicle and the transaction to
validate forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881." Id. at 503.
In United States v. 42450 Highway 441, 920 F.2d 900 (1 lth Cir. 1991), negotiations
for cocaine shipments occurred in a single family home on a one-acre parcel of land.
Although no drugs were ever brought onto the property and no money was ever ex-
changed on the property, the court approved the forfeiture. The Eleventh Circuit ex-
plained: "[Tihe property was used to negotiate and plan an essential component of a
specific drug transaction that actually took place. The conspirators met regularly on the
property and discussed the details of their plan there. Moreover, they travelled from the
house to inspect the proposed landing site nearby." Id. at 903. Clearly, the property
was not indispensable. In fact, the claimant owned an additional 40 acres of land. Id. If
the one-acre lot in question had been unavailable, the illegal activities could have oc-
curred elsewhere without impediment.
In United States v. Santoro, the government documented four sales of "[simall
amounts of cocaine." 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir. 1989). The sales took place on a
small section of land separated from the rest of the property by a road. The entire 26
acres, worth $100,000, were forfeited. Id. at 1540-41. The court stated that the prop-
erty need be "only fortuitously connected with drug trafficking" in order to come under
§ 881's reach. Id. at 1542.
In United States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424 (11th Cir. 1983), the
claimant drove his car to a hotel to negotiate a drug purchase. The owner was supposed
to pay for the drugs, but no cash was found in the automobile. The court concluded,
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tween the regulatory purpose and the punitive effect by reading a
"substantial connection" requirement into the statute. Unless the
government can show reason to believe that a substantial connec-
tion exists between the property and the predicate crime, these
courts will not approve a forfeiture. 20 6
"The subject vehicle in this case was used to transport the 'pivotal figure in the transac-
tion' several hundred miles to the precise location at which the attempted purchase took
place .. . . [T]he Porsche had a sufficient nexus to the attempted drug purchase to
support the forfeiture." Id. at 1427.
In United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, a condominium owner made two co-
caine sales for a total of $250 (one and one-half grams of cocaine) in his home. The
government informant who purchased the drugs requested that the first sale take place
in the condominium after the claimant proposed another site. For ten weeks following
the second sale, the government informant called the condominium owner every day
requesting further drug transactions, but the condominium owner always refused. The
government informant observed only small amounts of drugs, never any more than
would be expected of an individual's personal use. Finally, a search of the premises
found no weapons, drugs or other evidence of drug transactions. 747 F. Supp. 173, 175
(E.D.N.Y. 1990). Despite the minimal nature of the connection between the property
and the illegal conduct, the court authorized the forfeiture of a $70,000 condominium.
206 See, e.g., United States v. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1990) ("We have
consistently required that there be a 'substantial connection' between the property for-
feited and the drug activity."); United States v. 7715 Betsy Bruce Lane, 906 F.2d 110,
112 (4th Cir. 1990) ("In order for the court to find probable cause that the house was
used or was intended to be used to facilitate a crime, the evidence must demonstrate
that there was a substantial connection between the property and the underlying crimi-
nal activity."); United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 900 F.2d 470, 472 (1st Cir.
1990) ("[The government] established probable cause to believe that there was a sub-
stantial connection between the claimants' property and drug trafficking, and hence that
the property was subject to forfeiture."); United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d
1258 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring sufficient nexus similar to substantial connection test);
United States v. 3639-2nd St., 869 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (8th Cir. 1989); Santoro, 866 F.2d
at 1542; United States v. 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he
United States must establish probable cause to believe that a substantial connection ex-
ists between the property to be forfeited and the illegal exchange of a controlled sub-
stance."); United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir.
1985) (not reaching the question of whether a substantial connection is necessary, but
establishing some minimum nexus requirement).
The Fifth Circuit has adopted an "any connection" standard for § 881 (a) (4) actions
and the substantial connection standard for § 881(a)(6) actions. See United States v.
1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. One 1979
Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. $364,960 in
United States Currency, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir. 1981). As § 881(a)(7) is phrased
similarly to § 881(a) (4), one would expect the Fifth Circuit to apply the any connection
standard to § 881(a) (7) actions. See Santoro, 866 F.2d at 1542 ("Although this Court has
never expressly addressed this issue as it relates to 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7), we have found
the 'substantial connection' standard appropriate under the analogous provision of 21
U.S.C. § 881(a)(4).").
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted the substantial connection standard for
§ 881 (a) (6) forfeitures of proceeds, but questions whether that standard should apply in
forfeiture actions aimed at derivative contraband. See United States v. 3097 S.W. 111th
Ave., 921 F.2d 1551, 1555-56 (lth Cir. 1991) ("The term 'substantial connection' is
found in the legislative history of the 1978 amendment to 21 U.S.C. § 881, which added
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Despite such judicial attempts to limit the reach of forfeitures,
§ 881 is applied in an excessively punitive manner in all circuits.
First, many federal courts have been explicit in their application of
an "any connection" standard.207 One circuit noted, "[T]he gov-
ernment must show that it had reasonable grounds to believe that
the property was related to an illegal drug transaction .... [W]e
decline to read a 'substantial connection' requirement into the for-
feiture statute." 208 Circuits adopting the any connection standard
have by definition rejected an indispensability requirement. 20 9
In jurisdictions that have demanded a substantial connection,
the application of § 881 remains the same. The standard requires
merely that the property have "[m]ore than an incidental or fortui-
tous connection to criminal activity. ' 210 Most courts look for evi-
dence that the property simply had some small nexus to a crime.
The substantial connection requirement rejects the notion that
property must be indispensable in order to be an instrumentality of
crime. As one court explained:
Under the substantial connection test, the property must be used or
intended to be used to commit a crime, or must facilitate the commis-
sion of a crime. At [a] minimum, the property must have more than an
incidental or fortuitous connection to criminal activity. Still, the lan-
to the statute paragraph (6), a provision providing for the forfeiture of the proceeds of a
drug transaction. Nothing indicates that the term was intended to apply to other forfei-
ture actions."); 42450 Highway 441, 920 F.2d at 902; United States v. $41,305 in Cur-
rency and Traveler's Checks, 802 F.2d 1339, 1343 (1 1th Cir. 1986). But see United
States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424, 1426 (11th Cir. 1983) ("To support
a forfeiture under § 881, the government must demonstrate probable cause for the be-
lief that a substantial connection exists between the vehicle to be forfeited and the rele-
vant criminal activity.").
207 See, e.g., United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. $5,644,540 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir.
1986); United States v. Fleming, 677 F.2d 602, 609-10 (7th Cir. 1982); United States v.
One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir. 1981); One 1974 Cadillac
Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d at 423 ("The question is whether there was a sufficient nexus
between the use of the Cadillac... to amount to a facilitation in any manner of the later
sale of the controlled substance."); United States v. 1205 Beron Drive, No. 89-3622,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14265, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 1990) ("It is not necessary for the
Government to establish a 'substantial' connection between the property and the felony
drug transaction .... A single drug transaction occurring on the real property is suffi-
cient to violate 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7)."); 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. at 176 (de-
fining "facilitate" as "to make easier").
208 $5,644,540 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d at 1362 (emphasis added).
209 See 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d at 493 ("The legislation itself, however, no more
demands that the property be 'substantially connected' to the underlying offense than it
requires that the property be 'indispensable' to the crime.").
210 United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 990 (4th Cir. 1990). See also United States
v. 1933 Commonwealth Ave., 913 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990); 3639-2nd St., 869 F.2d at
1096-97 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lots Eighteen & Nineteen, 657 F. Supp. 1062,
1065 (E.D. Va. 1987).
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guage of § 881 (a) (7) makes clear that it is irrelevant whether the prop-
erty is even used at all in the commission of a crime, so long as it is
intended to be used .... It is also irrelevant whether the property's
role in the crime is integral, essential or indispensable. The term "fa-
cilitate" implies that the property need only make the prohibited con-
duct "less difficult or 'more or less free from obstruction or
hindrance.' ". . . Just one use of the property may be enough, given
that a single violation is sufficient under § 881(a)(7). 2 1 1
Indeed, every circuit that has mouthed the substantial connec-
tion language has applied the any connection standard. 21 2 As one
court noted, "[T]he differences between this ['substantial connec-
tion'] approach and our own appear largely to be semantic rather
than practical." 2 13 Courts allow forfeiture of property when the
government can establish probable cause that there is some connec-
tion between the property in question and illegal drugs.
Even if courts read the more stringent indispensability require-
ment into § 881, the provisions of the statute would still go far be-
yond what is necessary to achieve the remedial aim of reducing
illegal drug transactions. If the concern is not to punish felons but
merely to remove instrumentalities from their hands, why not sim-
ply require property owners to sell derivative contraband coming
211 Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 990 (quoting 3639-2nd St., 869 F.2d at 1096). See also United
States v. 42450 Highway 441, 920 F.2d 900, 903 (11 th Cir. 1991) ("[E]ven those circuits
that adopt the substantial connection test have not imposed the requirement that the
property be integral, essential, or indispensable to the transaction."); United States v.
$148,215 in United States Currency, 768 F. Supp. 525, 527-28 (W.D.N.C. 1991).
212 See, e.g., 42450 Highway 441, 920 F.2d at 902 ("This conflict between the Circuits
may well be 'semantic rather than practical.' For instance, the courts agree that property
is used to 'facilitate' a crime when it makes the illegal activity 'easy or less difficult,'
ensures that the crime will be 'more or less free from obstruction or hindrance,' or 'les-
sens the labor' involved in handling illegal substances.") (citations omitted); United
States v. One 1979 Porsche Coupe, 709 F.2d 1424, 1427 (11 th Cir. 1983); United States
v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S, 590 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir. 1978).
Rarely is the "substantial connection" standard applied to invalidate a § 881 forfei-
ture action. But see, e.g., United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 893 F.2d 1245
(11 th Cir. 1990); United States v. One Gates Learjet, 861 F.2d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 1988)
(not expressly adopting a substantial connection standard, but invalidating a § 881 for-
feiture for insufficient nexus when only three to four milligrams of cocaine were recov-
ered by a vacuum sweep); United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 816 F.2d
1538 (11 th Cir. 1987); United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769 F.2d 525,
527 (8th Cir. 1985) (not expressly adopting a substantial connection standard, but inval-
idating a § 881 forfeiture for insufficient nexus when a truck was driven to a field where
marijuana was grown); United States v. $12,585 in United States Currency, 669 F. Supp.
939 (D. Minn. 1987), rev'd sub nom., United States v. 3639-2nd St., 869 F.2d 1093 (8th
Cir. 1989); Lots Eighteen & Nineteen, 657 F. Supp. 1062; In re One 1972 Datsun, 378 F.
Supp. 1200, 1204 (D.N.H. 1974) (requiring a "substantial and/or instrumental connec-
tion" and invalidating a § 881 forfeiture of an automobile used to lead an undercover
agent to a drug sale).
213 United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d at 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1990).
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under § 881? Or why not return all proceeds from the sale of for-
feited assets to the claimant? The desired remedial end would be
achieved - the dangerous items would no longer be in the hands of
criminals, and the punitive impact would be no greater than neces-
sary to accomplish the regulatory goal. 2 14
Further minimizing the remedial claim, § 881 permits claimants
to re-purchase their property.215 Thus, § 881 forfeitures are the
functional equivalent of monetary fines. The particular property is
irrelevant to the litigation. A "forced sale" scheme would better
achieve the remedial aim by prohibiting ownership of all similar
tools of crime. Just as persons convicted of violent felonies are not
allowed to possess firearms, the government could prohibit drug
dealers from owning airplanes or ships.2 16
Section 881 goes beyond its regulatory purposes in other re-
spects. A court adjudicating a civil forfeiture action under the Act
need not inquire into whether the property may facilitate felonies in
the future, something central to a "preventive" scheme.217 The
statute permits forfeiture of property intended to be used to violate
the law. The language of § 881 does not require a determination of
continuing illegal use. If § 881 were truly aimed at preventing fu-
214 See Clark, supra note 65, at 479.
215 21 U.S.C. § 881 (d); 19 U.S.C. § 1614 (1992); 19 C.F.R. §§ 162.43-.44 (1990). Sec-
tion 1614 has been described as a bond procedure whereby the owner puts up security
to cover the value of the government's interest in the property. In re Newport Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 928 F.2d 472, 479-80 (1st Cir. 1991).
216 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1992) (federal offense for convicted felons to possess fire-
arms); Clark, supra note 65, at 479.
217 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d at 494 ("The court expressly overruled the district
court's requirement of a continuing drug business or ongoing operation."); United
States v. 3639-2nd St., 869 F.2d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e find no requirement
of a continuing drug business or ongoing operation. Rather, we believe that if persons
'make real property available as a situs for an illegal drug transaction, it is forfeitable,' as
the forfeiture statute requires only 'a violation' of the title.") (citations omitted); United
States v. 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d 232, 236 (9th Cir. 1988) (Ferguson, J., concurring)
("[W]hen the government commenced federal forfeiture proceedings against [the claim-
ant's] property ... [the claimant] was no longer growing marijuana on his land; state
authorities had previously seized the plants ... while executing a search warrant. Nor
does any evidence suggest that [the claimant] intended to use his property in the future
for marijuana cultivation."). But see United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-Up, 769
F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1985) ("[T]here is but speculation to suggest [the vehicle] was to
be used to transport marijuana in the future."); In re One 1972 Datsun, 378 F. Supp.
1200, 1205 (D.N.H. 1974) ("The government has not alleged that claimant uses the
Datsun as part of the modus operandi of an ongoing criminal narcotics enterprise, nor
has it alleged that the Datsun has been specifically adapted for illicit narcotics activity.
Absent such allegations, it is not clear that forfeiture of the vehicle will help to prevent
the illegal sale of narcotics any more than forfeiture of any number of claimant's per-
sonal effects which facilitate his ability to deal with such commonplace and everyday
problems as transportation.").
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ture violations of the law, the inquiry would focus on evidence indi-
cating future uses of property.
Section 881 also surpasses its regulatory aims through the limit-
less nature of real property forfeitures. If drugs are sold in a se-
cluded barn located on a 200-acre farm, the entire 200 acres (with
all crops and buildings) are subject to forfeiture. Even if an easily
distinguishable portion of the property is connected to the predicate
drug sale, the entire tract will be forfeited.218
Despite some questioning,2 19 no federal appeals court has in-
validated the "whole tract" provision. The metaphysics of labeling
a piece of land an "instrumentality of crime" are dubious. Even ac-
cepting the initial description of the property as a tool of the drug
trade, when an illegal transaction occurs on an isolated section of a
larger tract of land, only part of the real property has facilitated the
predicate act. Any forfeiture beyond the immediate property used is
unnecessary to accomplish a remedial purpose. 220
Improvements in real property are also subject to forfeiture
without reimbursement. 22' A property owner might add a building
to a tract of land after the illegal conduct but before the government
has sought forfeiture. The new building will be forfeited regardless
of the impossibility of any connection to the crime. Indeed, if the
218 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
219 The Second Circuit, for example, questioned the propriety of such broad
forfeitures:
The theory of civil forfeiture is that the property devoted to an unlawful purpose is
tainted as an instrumentality of crime and therefore must be condemned. While
that concept makes sense for a car or a boat, and perhaps for a home and its curti-
lage, it raises troubling questions when applied to all of an individual's contiguous
property. At some point, it seems that a forfeiture would cross the line of condemn-
ing an instrumentality of crime and move into the area of punishing a defendant by
depriving him of his estate. If punishment is involved, the Constitution requires
many more procedural protections than are available under civil forfeiture.
United States v. 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d 1258, 1270 (2d Cir. 1989). Although
apparently willing to rein in § 881(a) (7), the Second Circuit in 4492 Livonia Road never
reached the issue because the claimant did not raise it. The Second Circuit later re-
jected the constitutional argument in United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 880
(2d Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowa County, 727 F. Supp. 1414,
1422 (11 th Cir. 1990) ("The United States argues that all of Texas would be forfeited
under a literal reading of § 881 (a)(7) if Texas were owned by one person, and if one acre
of it was used in a drug deal with the owner's knowledge or consent. The larger the tract
and the smaller the portion misused, the more questionable may become the constitu-
tionality of a literal application of the § 881 (a)(7) language. This court is happy not to
have had to deal with this question."), aff'd, 930 F.2d 857 (11 th Cir. 1991).
220 Even if the smaller portion cannot be separated from the whole, the government
could sell the property and reimburse the claimant for the value of the non-offending
portion. See United States v. 2 Burditt St., 924 F.2d 383, 385 (Ist Cir. 1991) ("[Claim-
ant] seeks reimbursement from the government for the value of his improvements
[made after the illegal conduct]."); 300 Cove Rd., 861 F.2d at 235.
221 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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changes are significant enough, the tool of crime may no longer ex-
ist, denying the need for the forfeiture entirely. The government
ought to reimburse the claimant for the value of the improvements.
An analogy can be drawn between civil forfeitures and preven-
tive detention. In many ways, the concerns in preventive detention
decisions mirror those in forfeiture decisions. In the forfeiture con-
text, property is seized to prevent future anti-social conduct. In the
preventive detention context, a person is seized to prevent future
anti-social conduct (as well as to prevent the defendant from fleeing
the jurisdiction or destroying evidence before the trial).
In federal courts, preventive detention is governed by the Bail
Reform Act of 1984.222 The Supreme Court found the Act to be
constitutional in United States v. Salerno.223 The Court implicitly ap-
plied the Ward test, declaring Congress' intention to be regulatory
rather than penal. 224 Given that the legislative intention was appro-
priate, the Court then applied the' sixth and seventh Mendoza-Marti-
nez factors to determine whether the scheme exceeded its regulatory
justifications. 225
The Court found that the pre-trial detention procedure is tai-
lored to the remedial aim.226 First, the Bail Reform Act requires a
finding of future dangerousness if the detention is supposed to pre-
vent violent acts.227 The statute also lists a number of possible re-
lease conditions which limit the need for actual confinement. 228
The government is required to find the least restrictive alternative in
order to accomplish its remedial aims. 229
In addition, the Bail Reform Act's procedural protections are
substantially greater than those of § 881. The rights to counsel, to
testify, to compulsory process and to confrontation are guaranteed
in all preventive detention hearings. 230 The framework can legiti-
mately be called civil because the detention is narrowly tailored to
the remedial ends, thus justifying a lower burden of proof. Even
with the civil label, the Bail Reform Act requires that the govern-
222 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-50 (1992).
223 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
224 Id. at 747.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 747-48.
227 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
228 Id. § 3142(c).
229 Id. § 3142(e). An accused cannot be detained without a finding that "[n]o condi-
tion or combination of conditions [short of imprisonment] will reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person in the commu-
nity." Id.
230 Id. § 3142(f)(2).
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ment prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. 231
Section 881 could be amended to tailor its sanction to a civil
purpose. Courts should be required to make an initial determina-
tion that removing the property from the hands of the owner would
make future violations more difficult. The Bail Reform Act does not
have an analogous provision because the effectiveness of its form of
incapacitation is obvious - people in jail cannot commit violent
crimes against members of the general public. In the civil forfeiture
context, a court should have to find the property so necessary for
the commission of a crime and so difficult to replace that forfeiture
would serve a regulatory purpose. Courts should also have to deter-
mine future risks of leaving property in the hands of claimants. An
asset may be indispensable for certain activities, but its owner may
be unlikely to allow its use in further offenses. Upon a finding of
future dangerousness, the forfeiture statute should demand that
judges examine less restrictive alternatives, such as requiring the
owner to sell the asset or seizing only part of the property.
Even with these changes, however, § 881's remedial aims still
might be outshadowed by its punitive impact. Pre-trial detention as
envisioned in the Bail Reform Act does not have the permanence of
a § 881 forfeiture. The Salerno Court was careful to limit its ruling
with regard to timing: "Nor are the incidents of pretrial detention
excessive in relation to the regulatory goal Congress sought to
achieve .... The arrestee is entitled to a prompt detention hearing
and the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the strin-
231 Id. The Supreme Court has explicitly interpreted this provision as placing the bur-
den of proof on the government: "The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Act) allows a federal
court to detain an arrestee pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions 'will reason-
ably assure... the safety of any other person and the community.' " United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)).
In some instances, the burden of proof shifts under the scheme. The statute de-
clares that under certain circumstances, "[a] rebuttable presumption arises that no con-
dition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person
and the community." Id. § 3142(e). The rebuttable presumption typically applies when
the defendant has been accused of committing a crime within five years of being re-
leased from prison or being convicted of another serious crime or upon a finding of
probable cause to believe that the person committed a serious drug felony.
This automatic shift in the burden of proof is probably unconstitutional for the
same reasons § 881's shift is unconstitutional, but a lesser preponderance of the evi-
dence standard on the government might satisfy the Due Process Clause. See supra note
78. Although the Salerno Court found the Bail Reform Act to be constitutional, the
Court's decision was limited to the application of § 3142(f)(2), in which the government
bears the burden of proof. The Court was careful to point out that it was not addressing
those sections of the Bail Reform Act involving an automatic shift in the presumption of
dangerousness. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745 n.3.
328 [Vol. 83
1992] ASSET FORFEITURE 329
gent time limitations of the Speedy Trial Act." 232 The Salerno
Court, in discussing the issue of timing, suggested that a sanction so
narrowly tailored as to be the only means of achieving a legitimately
remedial end might still have a disproportionately punitive impact.
If a preventive detention framework existed independent of the
criminal justice system and if permanent or long-term incapacitation
was the least restrictive means of achieving the remedial aims, de-
tention would still be inappropriate without a finding of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of a predicate criminal act.233
Unlike the Bail Reform Act, § 881 is not limited to a set period
of time while a claimant faces criminal charges. The Court has ex-
plicitly recognized the relevance of the timing question in the forfei-
ture setting:
[I]t would be odd to conclude that the Government may not restrain
property, such as the home and apartment in respondent's possession,
based on a finding of probable cause, when we have held that (under
appropriate circumstances), the Government may restrain persons
where there is a finding of probable cause to believe that the accused
has committed a serious offense. Given the gravity of the offenses
charged in the indictment, respondent himself could have been sub-
jected to pretrial restraint if deemed necessary to "reasonably assure
[his] appearance [at trial] and safety of... the community," we find no
constitutional infirmity in [the forfeiture statute's] authorization of a
similar restraint on respondent's property to protect its "appearance" at
trial, and protect the community's interest in full recovery of any ill-gotten
gains.
2 3 4
Whether the permanence of a § 881 forfeiture demands a
higher burden of proof is admittedly arguable. Perhaps the Court
is hesitant to conclude that a sanction is primarily remedial when
232 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (citations omitted). The Court further explained, "We
intimate no view as to the point at which detention in a particular case might become
excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress' regulatory goal."
Id. at 747 n.4. The Court's reasoning was tied to the notion that a pre-trial detainee is in
a special situation: "While the Government's general interest in preventing crime is
compelling, even this interest is heightened when the Government musters convincing
proof that the arrestee, already indicted or held to answer for a serious crime, presents a
demonstrable danger to the community. Under these narrow circumstances, society's
interest in crime prevention is at its greatest." Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750. See also Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736 (1972).
233 See Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REv. 510, 556-58 (1986).
234 United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615-16 (1989) (brackets within quotation
marks, ellipses and first emphasis in original, second emphasis added). The Court held
that the lower probable cause standard is acceptable in instances of temporary seizure,
but implied that a proceeding with a higher standard of proof might be necessary for
permanent forfeiture based on past criminal acts: "We have previously permitted the
Government to seize property based on a finding of probable cause to believe that the
property will ultimately be proven forfeitable." Id. (citations omitted).
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never-ending imprisonment is a possibility, but would not be so
concerned when property is involved. Detention of people has al-
ways been viewed as requiring special protections. 235 If the lan-
guage in Salerno establishes a general principle, however, then
incapacitation through a permanent deprivation of either liberty or
property is by definition excessive in relation to the goal of prevent-
ing violent felonies. To survive scrutiny, § 881 should be amended
either to provide for only temporary seizures of assets or to require
proof of the predicate act beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Remedial Justifications and Compensation
Another possible remedial justification for forfeiture is compen-
sation for the costs of fighting crime. When enforcing criminal laws,
the government may require a wrongdoer to pay back the costs of
investigating and preventing anti-social behavior.236
Several courts have described § 881 as remedial because for-
feitures reimburse the government for its efforts. 23 7 The First Cir-
cuit has argued:
Forfeiture of the entire property is a justifiable means to remedy the
injury to the government itself that results from illegal marijuana op-
erations, hence the forfeiture would be unlikely to constitute a "pun-
ishment" . . . . The Supreme Court has frequently held that one
important difference between criminal and civil penalties is that the
former are primarily punitive or deterrent in their purpose - calcu-
235 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has approved pro-
longed detention without a finding of criminal guilt beyond a reasonable doubt only in
special circumstances, such as when an accused is judged mentally ill. Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
236 The Supreme Court has praised the potential for raising funds as a regulatory or
civil purpose:
[The] forfeiture is intended to aid in the enforcement of tariff regulations. It pre-
vents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States, and, by its mon-
etary penalty, it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages for violation of
the inspection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government for investigation
and enforcement expenses.
One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 237 (1972). See also Caplin
& Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629-30 (1989); United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446 (1989); Fried, supra note 62, at 362; Petrov, supra note 60, at
830.
237 See, e.g., United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 1989); United
States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir. 1989); One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan,
548 F.2d at 424 ("The Government is also compensated in part for its enforcement
efforts, which are substantial .... ); United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F.
Supp. 173, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Retribution and deterrence are not legitimate
nonpunitive governmental objectives. On the other hand, the application of property
seized towards the government's enforcement expenses is a well-recognized remedial
purpose.") (citations omitted); United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. at
1295, 1297 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
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lated to "vindicate public justice," - while civil penalties are primarily
remedial and designed to "protect the government from financial
lOSS." 23 8
Section 881 explicitly provides that the proceeds of forfeitures may
be used to pay "[a]ll property expenses of the proceedings for for-
feiture and sale including expenses of seizure, maintenance of cus-
tody, advertising and court costs." ' 239
Forfeiture of distinctly identified assets, however, is not reason-
ably related to the remedial aim of compensation. If the govern-
ment wishes to charge citizens for enforcement costs, a traditional
civil fine would be sufficient.240 Directing forfeitures at property in-
volved in crime frustrates reimbursement in some cases and exceeds
it in others. The requirement that assets be connected to the predi-
cate offense defines the compensation available to the government.
The worth of the property may have no connection to the resources
expended by law enforcement officials. If a wealthy real estate in-
vestor plans a drug sale in a city park and takes public transporta-
tion, § 881 would not provide for forfeiture of any property except
for the drugs themselves and any proceeds from the sale. Mean-
while, if a patrol officer stumbles upon the same cocaine purchase in
large shopping mall owned by the investor, the government would
be able to seize the entire structure regardless of enforcement costs
or societal impact.241
238 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d at 43 (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943)).
239 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(2)(i).
240 See Petrov, supra note 60, at 835. Section 881 and § 1614 permit claimants to re-
purchase their assets at a price set by government officials. See supra note 224 and ac-
companying text. Although the repurchase option tightens the fit between the remedial
purpose of compensation and § 881's actual impact, the issue is not completely re-
solved. Why should a claimant have to go through the extra set of procedures if a direct
monetary fine would be sufficient?
241 A real-life example of the valuation problem occurs when the government forfeits
a public housing leasehold. When the government seizes such a leasehold, it gains
nothing monetarily. As one court recognized:
When someone's lands (commercial real estate, residence or what have you) or
goods (most frequently in drug cases a vehicle - an automobile, a boat or even an
airplane) are forfeited, the United States acquires often valuable property while at
the same time punishing the wrongdoer. Millions of dollars are generated by the
seizure and forfeiture of such properties or of money forfeited under like circum-
stances. But what can be said for the extinction of a low-income public housing
lease in terms of tangible benefit to the United States? [Tihe net effect of this line
of activity will be punitive as to the few individuals involved but purely cosmetic in
governmental terms - nice headline-grabbers that mask the failure of the vaunted
"war on drugs" to deal with our massive drug problems in any meaningful way.
United States v. Leasehold Interest in 900 E. 40th St., Apartment 102, 740 F. Supp. 540,
541 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
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In Halper v. United States,24 2 the Supreme Court invoked the idea
of "rough justice." A civil sanction need not perfectly correspond
to the compensation deserved by the government. 243 Yet such an
approach hardly dictates that a court should ignore the relationship
between the remedial purpose and the punitive impact of a sanction.
The Halper Court explicitly called for an accounting of government
expenses when a potentially punitive situation arises:
Where a defendant previously has sustained a criminal penalty and the
civil penalty sought in the subsequent proceeding bears no rational
relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss, but
rather appears to qualify as "punishment" in the plain meaning of the
word, then the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Govern-
ment's damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact
constitutes a second punishment .... While the trial court's judgment
in these matters often may amount to no more than an approximation,
even an approximation will go far towards ensuring both that the Gov-
ernment is fully compensated for the costs of corruption and that, as
required by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the defendant is protected
from a sanction so disproportionate to the damages caused that it con-
stitutes a second punishment.244
The "rough justice" approach should not be misconstrued to per-
mit courts to ignore the actual expenses imposed on the govern-
ment when determining whether a statute is remedial in nature.
Unfortunately, § 881 does not call for any calculations of inves-
tigation and litigation costs. Courts adjudicating § 881 actions con-
cern themselves only with allegations of illegal conduct.245 Civil
forfeiture prosecutions under the Act are not related in any manner
to the regulatory goal of reimbursement. Rather than being the pri-
242 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
243 Id. at 449. See also Clark, supra note 65, at 469.
244 Halper, 490 U.S. at 449-50.
After discussing the "rough justice" standard in a § 881 action, one court
explained:
[W]here an owner negligently or wilfully permits property to be used in violation of
the criminal law, due process requires that a civil penalty bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose of compensating the government for its efforts in attempt-
ing to discover the violations, to prosecute the violators, and to avert or mitigate the
consequent harms.
United States v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. 173, 177 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
245 Most courts that have evaluated § 881 have ignored any remedial rationale based
on compensation. See supra notes 148-54, 190-91, 200-17 and accompanying text.
Those courts that have presented § 881 as a compensation scheme have also ignored the
costs expended by the government in any particular lawsuit. See, e.g., United States v. 40
Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538
(4th Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421 (2d
Cir. 1977); Charney, supra note 113, at 499. Even after recognizing the importance of
such a relationship, one court summarily concluded that the government's drug opera-
tions generally cost money and approved a forfeiture without any inquiry into the exact
costs in the particular case. 38 Whaler's Cove Drive, 747 F. Supp. at 179.
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mary purpose, reimbursement is a nice incidental effect that accom-
panies the punishment meted out in § 881 forfeiture actions.
In addition, the bond posted by claimants usually serves to re-
imburse the government for the expenses of forfeiture proceed-
ings.2 4 6 Claimants do not receive their property in return for the
bond. Instead, the government holds onto both the bond and the
seized assets. 247 Although the bond posted might amount to less
than the government's costs in pursuing a forfeiture action, the
bond ensures some compensation for the government regardless of
the value of the property. Section 881 does not require a determi-
nation of whether the additional value of the property is necessary
to repay the government for investigating and prosecuting the case.
Finally, empirical analysis belies the alleged remedial purpose
of compensation. Drug-related forfeitures have gone beyond strict
reimbursement of enforcement costs. The statute explicitly permits
forfeiture proceeds to finance "[a]wards of up to $100,000 to any
individual who provides original information which leads to the
arrest and conviction of a person who kills or kidnaps a Federal drug
law enforcement agent. '2 48 Further, the Attorney General may
keep forfeited property "[flor official use." 24 9 If the Attorney Gen-
eral does not put the funds to use, the remainder is forwarded to the
246 The customs provisions governing § 881 forfeitures direct that "[iln the case of
condemnation of the article so claimed the obligor [on the bond] shall pay all the costs
and expenses of the proceedings to obtain such condemnation." 19 U.S.C. § 1608. See
also United States v. Route 1, Box 111, 920 F.2d 788, 790 (1 lth Cir. 1991) ("[T]he bond
in this case is a cost bond and is at risk only to the extent of the cost of the forfeiture
proceedings. Therefore, the Claimant should receive any balance remaining from the
bond after the United States has been afforded the opportunity to prove costs.").
247 See id.; United States v. One 1987 Chevrolet Corvette, 746 F. Supp. 865, 866 (E.D.
Wisc. 1990) ("Sections 1608 and 1316.76(b) permit the United States to deduct the
costs and expenses it incurs as the result of being a party to a forfeiture action [from the
cost bond posted by claimant]."); United States v. Lot 9, Block 1, Village E. Unit 4, 704
F. Supp. 1025, 1030-31 (D. Colo. 1989) (declaring forfeited both subject property and
bond posted).
Federal regulations are explicit. 19 C.F.R. § 162.47(c) (1990) reads: "The filing of a
claim and the giving of a bond, if required, pursuant to [19 U.S.C. § 1608] shall not be
construed to entitle the claimant to possession of the property. Such action only stops
the summary forfeiture proceeding." Another provision states: "The filing of the claim
and the posting of the bond does not entitle the claimant to possession of the property.
however, it does stop the administrative forfeiture proceedings." 21 C.F.R.
§ 1316.76(b) (1990).
The bond required to prevent summary forfeiture, as provided by 19 U.S.C. § 1608,
should not be confused with the additional costs of re-purchasing the property from the
government while the forfeiture is pending, as provided by 19 U.S.C. § 1614 and de-
scribed supra at note 224 and accompanying text.
248 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(2)(ii) (1990).
249 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(1)(A) (1990). Section 881 gives the Attorney General a
number of options for disposing of the proceeds of a forfeiture, including reimbursing
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Treasurer of the United States as general federal revenues. 250
As a result of the broad delegation of authority, government
agencies use § 881 to support activities unrelated to the individual
case generating the revenues. Local and federal authorities use for-
feitures to purchase expensive equipment, hire additional officers,
expand office space, fund drug treatment programs and even ex-
pand public elementary and high school facilities. 25' In effect, § 881
has turned into a fund-raising mechanism independent of any par-
ticular law enforcement efforts.
Perhaps more troublesome, most civil forfeiture proceedings
cannot compensate the government for enforcing criminal laws be-
cause criminal prosecutions do not occur in the vast majority of
these cases. The remedial purpose for forfeiting property cannot be
to pay for the forfeiture of the property, or else the remedial ration-
ale would become implausibly circular. The government could save
its resources simply by not forfeiting the property in the first place.
foreign and state governments for their role in the forfeiture effort. See Federal Seizure of
Illegal Assets, supra note 4.
250 21 U.S.C. § 881(e)(2)(B).
251 See Abraham Abramovsky, Asset Forfeiture, 206 N.Y. LJ. 3 (July 18, 1991); Fried,
supra note 62, at 362; Leonard Bernstein, Supervisors Back Move of Sheriff Headquarters, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1991, at B2; Use Drug Profits to Treat Addicts, NEWSDAY, Aug. 18, 1991, at
37; Peggy Y. Lee, Sheriff Would Like to Move Headquarters to Kearny Mesa, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
9, 1991, at A23; cf., Robert E. Kessler, LI Drug Money Going to Fight Drugs, NEWSDAY, July
3, 1991, at 33 (proceeds of drug-related forfeitures funding a 22% increase in police
department's budget in one year); Anti-drug Programs to Get County Grants, CHi. TRIB., May
17, 1991, § 2 at 3 (proceeds of drug-related forfeitures funding drug education pro-
grams); Soble, supra note 116 (proceeds of drug-related forfeitures funding helicopters,
drug education programs, additional police officers, automobiles, boats, and exotic
high-tech equipment); Dave Birkland, Drug Dealers 'Help' Police, SEATrLE TIMEs, Dec. 6,
1990, at G2 (proceeds of drug-related forfeitures funding general police activities be-
yond narcotics-related law enforcement); Sean P. Murphy, More Dealer Fooreitures Being
Used to Fight Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1990, at 21 ("Last year, the four-person
forfeiture unit at the U.S. attorney's office in Boston realized a net gain of $6 million.");
No to Virginia Literay Fund Changes, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1990, at G2 (proceeds of drug-
related forfeitures funding public school construction and a retirement fund for teach-
ers); see also, Isikoff, supra note 4; Federal Seizure of Illegal Assets, supra note 4; See also infra
notes 254, 258-59 and accompanying text.
In an extreme case, the sheriff of San Diego County opened a secret bank account
with between $300,000 and over $1 million in drug forfeiture proceeds after supervisors
prohibited him from spending proceeds from forfeitures without their approval. The
sheriff allegedly spent the money on a number of law-enforcement-related projects with-
out any guidelines or public review. Forfeiture proceeds were reportedly used to
purchase portable radios, video production equipment, computers, a portable copier,
and a laser printer. Nearly $70,000 of the funds were used to pay attorney's fees in civil
suits filed against a group of deputies dubbed "Rambo Squad" by the media. Soble,
supra note 116; see also Barry Horstman, Sheriff, County Reach Accord Over Drug Funds, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 1991, at BI; Mark Platte, Duffy Ordered Not to Touch Secret Account, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1990, at BI.
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Rather than reimbursing the government for the costs of the forfei-
ture proceeding itself, the proceeds should pay for the expenses of a
related criminal prosecution. A recent survey, however, revealed
that parallel criminal charges are filed in only twenty percent of
§ 881 cases. 252 To serve the remedial goal of reimbursing the gov-
ernment for its expenses in enforcing criminal laws, government
attorneys should initiate forfeiture proceedings only after a related
criminal prosecution has been completed and its costs
determined. 253
Some courts have argued that the remedial purpose goes be-
yond the investigation and litigation costs of the immediate case and
extends to other expenses in the war on drugs.254 The claimant
contributes to the fight against all drug dealers and users, regardless
of personal responsibility or costs in any particular case. Property
worth billions of dollars would have to be forfeited before the reme-
dial aims had been exceeded. One court has articulated the broader
compensation rationale:
The ravages of drugs upon our nation and the billions the government
is being forced to spend upon investigation and enforcement - not to
mention the costs of drug-related crime and drug abuse treatment, re-
habilitation, and prevention - easily justify a recovery in excess of the
strict value of the property actually devoted to growing the illegal
substance.255
By exceeding the costs imposed by the specific property owner,
such forfeitures go beyond the realm of civil sanctions, as the
Supreme Court expressed in Halper.256 Professor Charney has ar-
ticulated the need to match expenses with wrongdoers:
A suit can be viewed as compensatory only if property is transmitted to
252 Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Drug Law Leaves Trail of Innocents, CH.
TRIB., Aug. 11, 1991, § 1 at 1. The same survey also indicated potentially discriminatory
application of federal forfeiture statutes. Id. at 13 ("[A]n examination of 121 travelers'
cases in which police found no illegal drugs, made no arrest, but seized money anyway,
showed that 77% of the people stopped were Black, Hispanic or Asian.").
253 New York's civil forfeiture statute, for example, establishes different burdens of
proof depending upon whether the claimant has already been convicted of a crime. N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 10:442 (McKinney 1991).
254 E.g., United States v. 2 Burditt St., 924 F.2d 383, 395 (1st Cir. 1991); United States
v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d
1538, 1544 (4th Cir. 1989) (forfeiture of real property could serve the purpose of
"[f]inancing Government programs designed to eliminate drug-trafficking."); United
States v. Brock, 747 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (U.S. Marshal deposits proceeds
from sale of forfeited property to the U.S. Treasury after deducting for costs incident to
the forfeiture action); United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. at 1295, 1297
(W.D. Ark. 1990) ("Section 881(a)(7) is designed... to finance government programs
designed to eliminate drug trafficking.").
255 40 Moon Hill Drive, 884 F.2d at 44.
256 See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
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an identifiable individual or group of individuals and the value of that
property is actually determined by estimating the value of the interests
lost by the recipient as a result of the actions by the defendant. Any
less rigorous standard permits the government to obfuscate, to its own
benefit, the distinction between compensatory and punitive actions. 2
57
Resources expended by police to reduce a particular property
owner's contribution to the spread of controlled substances are ar-
guably costs imposed by the property owner. Thus, a requirement
that the owner pay those costs could be viewed as remedial. Like-
wise, if a drug dealer's sales harm particular people due to their
abuse of controlled substances, then a payment by the dealer to the
harmed people for the damages caused is compensatory. If the gov-
ernment takes assets for the purpose of funding government pro-
grams not directly related to the claimant's activities, however, the
government is pursuing a punitive goal and must afford criminal
protections. Forfeiture profits going to general drug rehabilitation
programs or investigations of law violators other than the claimant
do not serve a remedial purpose. Although drug rehabilitation is a
laudable goal, a criminal fine cannot be transformed into a civil one
by spending the proceeds on worthwhile causes.
Besides exceeding the remedial purposes of a civil sanction,
broad use of forfeitures as a fund-raising mechanism for law-en-
forcement agencies provides a dangerous motive for police. The
potential for improper motivation is obvious. The potential for for-
feiture gains motivates forfeitures and even influences what prop-
erty is seized. A representative from the U.S. Marshal's Service for
the Southern District of Texas described the attitude of many in the
law enforcement community: "The aim used to be to hurt the bad
guy. Now we want to hurt the bad guy and maximize profits for the
Government. ' 2 58 Professor Fried has decried the situation:
[T]he gap between the tasks with which the Justice Department is en-
257 Charney, supra note 113, at 499-500. See also Note, Narrowing the Scope of Civil Drug
Forfeiture, 89 MICH. L. REV. 165, 190 (1990) ("All criminal activity imposes social costs.
A civil remedy exists only when the costs of the single act can be associated with a spe-
cific harm.").
258 Belkin, supra note 4. A U.S. Marshal operating in the Southern District of Florida
explained, "Between us and the Resolution Trust Company, there are so many Govern-
ment houses for sale that the market has really softened in the last 18 months. Now we
always look at how much equity there is in a property before we seize it." Kukka, supra
note 4. An officer with the U.S. Marshal's Service in Maine reflected on the need to raise
funds: "We figured we'd break even on the sale, but until we sold it we had to keep
making mortgage payments and would ultimately lose money. In the future, we plan to
ask the United States' Attorney not to seize real estate unless there is a minimum
amount of equity in it." Id. Municipal police officers also feel the pressures to seize
assets to raise funds. An officer in southern California lamented that local police depart-
ments are "[u]nder pressure to be revenue producers." Soble, supra note 116.
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trusted and its resources tends to widen over time. This gap should
not be filled, however, by making the Justice Department dependent
on forfeited assets. The prosecutor's charging decisions may be dis-
torted by considerations of the most profitable course. Even the ap-
pearance of such distortion is intolerable. 259
In an age of tightening budgets, the use of civil forfeitures be-
comes even more questionable. Public officials have openly praised
the potential of drug-related civil forfeiture schemes to make up for
budget shortfalls. 2 60 As minimal judicial supervision is called for by
the statute, financing concerns could easily overtake crime-preven-
tion and justice as guides for prosecutorial decisions. Given the in-
centives that exist, forfeitures as revenue-generating devices cannot
be characterized as civil in nature. Section 881 forfeitures of deriva-
tive contraband constitute criminal punishment and should be af-
fected only upon proof of illegal conduct by a preponderance of the
evidence.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The Constitution provides important protections for all citizens
accused of wrongdoing. In particular, the Due Process Clause re-
quires the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt
before imposing criminal punishment. Congress should not be able
to avoid this requirement simply by labelling a sanction civil when it
is truly criminal in nature.
Section 881 forfeitures of derivative contraband further the
goals of deterrence and retribution and are not tailored to accom-
plish primarily remedial aims. Despite the importance of the war on
drugs, such forfeitures constitute criminal punishment and should
not be permitted unless the prosecution meets its burden according
to the reasonable doubt standard.
259 Fried, supra note 62, at 365-66. See also Soble, supra note 116; Isikoff, supra note 4;
No to Virginia Literary Fund Changes, supra note 251; Belkin, supra note 4.
260 See, Fried, supra note 62, at 362-63; Isikoff, supra note 4; John Ellement, DA Says
He's Out of Cash, Walsh Accuses Pina of Breaking Budget, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 1991, at 23
("Bristol County District Attorney Paul Walsh, Jr. said his office would close May 1 un-
less the state provided an emergency infusion of cash. [Former District Attorney Pina]
said the financial crisis could be averted when Walsh taps into $700,000 in assets seized
in connection with drug investigations now pending."); Murphy, More Dealer Foifeitures,
supra note 260 ("Stung by budget cuts and prodded by neighborhood anti-crime groups,
law enforcement officials are increasingly using new laws to seize cash and other prop-
erty from drug dealers to help finance drug-fighting .... When he assumes his new
office in January, [Massachusetts State Attorney General-Elect] Harshbarger said, he will
appoint a top assistant to work full time with district attorneys statewide to maximize
seizures under drug asset forfeiture laws .... Harshbarger said the $750,000 taken from
drug dealers in Middlesex County last year helped forestall layoffs due to a $1.1 million
cut in state funding.").
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